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Abstract 
Security is one of the major issues in any network and on the Internet. It encapsulates 
many different areas, such as protecting individual users against intruders, protecting 
corporate systems against damage, and protecting data from intrusion. It is obviously 
impossible to make a network totally secure, as there are so many areas that must be 
protected. This thesis includes an evaluation of current techniques for internal mis-
use of computer systems, and tries to propose a new way of dealing with this 
problem.  
 This thesis proposes that it is impossible to fully protect a computer network from 
intrusion, and shows how different methods are applied at differing levels of the OSI 
model. Most systems are now protected at the network and transport layer, with sys-
tems such as firewalls and secure sockets. A weakness, though, exists in the session 
layer that is responsible for user logon and their associated password. It is thus im-
portant for any highly secure system to be able to continually monitor a user, even 
after they have successfully logged into the system. This is because once an intruder 
has successfully logged into a system, they can use it as a stepping-stone to gain full 
access (often right up to the system administrator level). This type of login identifies 
another weakness of current intrusion detection systems, in that they are mainly fo-
cused on detecting external intrusion, whereas a great deal of research identifies that 
one of the main problems is from internal intruders, and from staff within an organi-
sation. Fraudulent activities can often he identified by changes in user behaviour. 
While this type of behaviour monitoring might not be suited to most networks, it 
could be applied to high secure installations, such as in government, and military or-
ganisations. 
 Computer networks are now one of the most rapidly changing and vulnerable sys-
tems, where security is now a major issue. A dynamic approach, with the capacity to 
deal with and adapt to abrupt changes, and be simple, will provide an effective mod-
elling toolkit. Analysts must be able to understand how it works and be able to apply 
it without the aid of an expert. Such models do exist in the statistical world, and it is 
the purpose of this thesis to introduce them and to explain their basic notions and 
structure. 
 One weakness identified is the centralisation and complex implementation of in-
trusion detection. The thesis proposes an agent-based approach to monitor the user 
 Abstract   v 
behaviour of each user. It also proposes that many intrusion detection systems can-
not cope with new types of intrusion. It thus applies Bayesian statistics to evaluate 
user behaviour, and predict the future behaviour of the user. The model developed is 
a unique application of Bayesian statistics, and the results show that it can improve 
future behaviour prediction than existing ARIMA models. The thesis argues that the 
accuracy of long-term forecasting questionable, especially in systems that have a 
rapid and often unexpected evolution and behaviour. Many of the existing models for 
prediction use long-term forecasting, which may not be the optimal type for intrusion 
detection systems. 
 The experiments conducted have varied the number of users and the time interval 
used for monitoring user behaviour. These results have been compared with ARIMA, 
and an increased accuracy has been observed. The thesis also shows that the new 
model can better predict changes in user behaviour, which is a key factor in identify-
ing intrusion detection.  
 The thesis concludes with recommendations for future work, including how the 
statistical model could be improved. This includes research into changing the specifi-
cation of the design vector for Bayesian. Another interesting area is the integration of 
standard agent communication agents, which will make the security agents more so-
cial in their approach and be able to gather information from other agents. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis. It defines the learning outcomes and measure of 
achievements. Along with this, the motivation of the work is defined, and a summary 
of the contribution of the research work. The chapter also includes background sec-
tions on Internet security and operating systems, and typical security breaches. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Motivation 
Security is one of the major issues in any network and on the Internet. It encapsulates 
many different areas, such as protecting individual users against intruders, protecting 
corporate systems against damage, and protecting data from intrusion. It is obviously 
impossible to make a network totally secure, as there are so many areas, which must 
be protected. Chapter 2 expands on this and presents the diagram shown in Figure 
1.1, which illustrates some of the methods that can be used to protect a network.  This 
just encapsulates data as it travels over the network, whereas security protects users, 
data and systems against both internal and external intruders. It is well known that 
many security systems, such as firewalls, are used to exclude external intruders, but 
these can offer few boundaries if an intruder attacks a system from within the net-
work. 
 Security is also complicated by new areas of development which must be pro-
tected against, such as: 
 
• Enhanced transaction processing. With distributed applications, single transac-
tions may span multiple hosts and multiple processes. However, applications 
must still guarantee the atomic integrity of transactions (that is, a unit of work). 
• Portable clients and servers. In distributed environments, both users and their 
applications can be portable. On the Internet, users can access applications from 
virtually any physical location. Similarly, system administrators may move appli-
cations and software components among various machines based on such factors 
as process loading, hardware failure, performance, and so on. 
• Enhanced data sets. Applications no longer deal with only simple data types. Cur-
rent technologies allow system designers to incorporate enhanced objects such as 
video, audio and multimedia into even the most basic applications. 
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Figure 1.1 Protecting data at differing levels 
With the move toward distributed processing, applications must continue to appear 
seamless to users. This can be difficult to implement, as there are changes to the un-
derlying architecture. Furthermore, distributed architectures increase this burden 
because they provide users easy access to a myriad of applications.  
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Figure 1.2 Protecting users, systems and data against internal and external intruders 
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 Distributed computing often contains many compromises for developers, such as 
giving ease-of-access that will typically increase security concerns. As a result, system 
designers that are developing for distributed environments benefit greatly when se-
curity is integral, as effective security cannot be added on as a patch [1.1]. 
 Unfortunately, most security systems in distributed systems are based on a passive 
and static model. A passive system is one which uses a defined set of rules, which are 
checked against, and a static system is one in which the system does not change its 
rules. In this model, once someone passes the security barrier, there are few methods 
of baring further intrusion, until it is too late. Passive authentication mechanisms are 
easy to break.   
1.3 The Subject of the Research 
Our research consists of evaluating current techniques for internal misuse of com-
puter systems, and tries to propose a new way of dealing with this problem. The 
authentication problem described in Section 2.1, has direct implications to the inter-
nal security of computer networks, and most of the time it results in internal misuse. 
The research uses intelligent agents to monitor the behaviour of each user, and uses 
Bayesian statistics to evaluate the user behaviour, and predict the future behaviour of 
the user. 
 Some important parameters for the research were: 
 
• Distributed systems. Software agents have been used as most computer systems 
are now interconnected, which makes the system as distributed as possible. As 
much as possible the security system  uses a small footprint size, in terms of both 
processing overhead and memory size, so it can be scalable and work in any size 
of computer system. The only common thing that all the computers have is that 
they are connected to some kind of network, either on an internal (intranet) 
and/or external (Internet). 
• Agent-based systems. To optimise the distribution of software components, the 
system is based around software agents. The user-end agent is deployed across all 
the nodes in the network, and the core agent, is deployed on a server. The user-
end agent monitors each user who logs into a nodes, and logs their activities. The 
first action of the user-end agent is to contact the core agent, and get the required 
user profile. This profile contains the specific user information on the previous 
history actions of the user, and prediction values for this user session. The user-
end agent monitors all the actions of the user, and the resources that are ac-
cepted, in terms of both local resources and network resources. Each user-end 
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agent collects information from the user behaviour, and sends them back to the 
core agent. The core agent is responsible for storing user profiles for all users that 
have access to the protected network. It is also responsible for giving the user pro-
file to the user-end agent, each time that a user profile is requested. It is also 
responsible for processing new profile data from each user and create new predic-
tion data using the new Bayesian model, that are stored in the user profile. 
• Results processing and forecasting. The research uses a mathematical model 
which allows for monitoring of results in a fast and highly adoptable system. The 
research has concluded that the problem of processing our monitoring data and 
making a prediction on these data is a linear problem and thus uses a statistical 
model rather than a neural networks version. The decision was based on the 
analysis of the initial data from the first range of experiments. For this, it was seen 
that a linear fashion is observed from user behaviour. If the data were not linear, 
we would have exponential curve-like graphs, or some kind of fractal shaped 
graphs. Thus, the research uses a short-term prediction using linear methods, and 
statistical methods are used to solve the prediction problem. These factors focus 
on the use of the multivariate Bayesian statistical method, which allows for the 
processing of all the different attributes of each user, concurrently, and can be 
highly modifiable, with minimum effort. By changing only the timing variable (the 
difference in time between two consecutive observations) of our statistical model, 
it is possible to process different statistical monitoring data from different users, 
something that is virtually impossible with other more traditional statistical sys-
tems.  
• Intrusion data. To verify the models used, the research has collected internal in-
trusion data from computer systems. It is obviously a difficult task to generate 
reliable intrusion data, as not all of the misuses are reported further than the in-
formation systems of the companies where the misuse has occurred [1.2].  
1.4 Prediction Techniques 
In this thesis, the terms, prediction and forecasting are used interchangeably, mainly 
for practical and reference reasons. Often authors use one of the terms discussing the 
same statistical concept. Forecasting is really the realisation of the future, based on 
some present and past knowledge. In general, there will be some sort of information 
on hand that can be used to anticipate the future. According to the kind of informa-
tion that is received, and the kind of predictions that are being produced, there are 
different types of systems. For example, there can be qualitative forecasting, which is 
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based on some non-numerical basis of information, or quantitative forecasting. This 
is based on an arithmetic translation of information, which can also be short-term or 
long-term forecasting.  
 For every case, this thesis will apply different methods and will always be aware of 
the particular restrictions and assumptions of the methods used. It will also use the 
relevant methodology that has been proven very effective for short-term predictions. 
It is argued that the accuracy of long-term forecasting questionable, especially in sys-
tems that have a rapid and often unexpected evolution and behaviour. For example, 
how would it have been possible to predict the Love Bug virus, the day before it oc-
curred? And, even in its first moments, how could it be possible to predict its spread 
the next day?  
 Computer networks are now one of the most rapidly changing and vulnerable sys-
tems, where security is now a major issue. A dynamic approach, with the capacity to 
deal with and adapt to abrupt changes, and be simple, will provide an effective mod-
elling toolkit. Analysts must be able to understand how it works and be able to apply 
it without the aid of an expert. Such models do exist in the statistical world, and it is 
the purpose of this thesis to introduce them and to explain their basic notions and 
structure. 
1.5 Learning outcomes of the PhD 
The SQA (Scottish Qualifications Authority) have defined four main learning out-
comes for a PhD. These are defined below, and along with the measure of 
achievement. 
 
LO1. The creation and interpretation of new knowledge, through original research, 
or other advanced scholarship, of a quality to satisfy peer review, extend the 
forefront of the discipline, and merit publication. 
The research work has defined a new agent-based system, based on an applica-
tion of a novel forecasting method.  It has merited publication at several key 
points: 
1. Triantafyllopoulos K and Pikoulas J, 'Multivariate Bayesian regression 
applied to the problem of network security', Journal of Forecasting. 
2. Pikoulas J, Buchanan W, Mannion M and Triantafyllopoulos K, ‘An Intel-
ligent Agent Security Intrusion System’, 9th IEEE Conference in ECBS, 
Lund, Sweden, April 2002. 
3. Pikoulas J, Buchanan W, Mannion M and Triantafyllopoulos K. ‘An 
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agent-based Bayesian forecasting model for enhanced network security’. 
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual IEEE International Conference and 
Workshop On the Engineering of Computer Based Systems-ECBS 2001. 
IEEE Comput. Soc. 2001, pp. 247–54.  
4. Pikoulas J, Buchanan WJ and Triantafyllopoulos K, ‘An Intelligent Intru-
sion Detection Environment using Software Agents’, Thirteenth 
International Conference Software & Systems Engineering and their Ap-
plications, Paris, December 2000. 
5. Pikoulas J, Mannion M, Buchanan WJ, ‘Software agents and computer 
network security’, Proceedings Seventh IEEE International Conference 
and Workshop on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems (ECBS 
2000). IEEE Comput. Soc. 2000, pp. 211–217.  
 
LO2. A systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of knowl-
edge, which is at the forefront of an academic discipline or area of 
professional practice. 
The work has involved investigating network intrusions systems, and methods 
of attack. From this, an agent-based model was created for the new method. 
These experiments initially used a small network with one server and two work-
stations. It also used different users and different timings to measure the results 
of the system. This experiment ensured that the system was functioning. It used 
just one user to test that the agents were working, and were monitoring each 
user correctly. It also tested that the agents were communicating properly and 
exchanging the required information. 
The next phase of experiments ensured that the system could handle an in-
creased information load, and ensured that the prediction system was working 
correctly. To measure the proposed system against another model, the results 
were compared with a commercially statistical software package. It was seen 
from this that the proposed system could handle more of an information load-
ing, and that the results were correct. 
In the final phase, the experiments used a large amount of data from our 
users and processed them to prove that the system can handle all kinds or in-
formation loads. These loadings verified that the system is only limited by the 
computational power of the server, and the speed of the network connections. 
It also showed at which numerical points the statistical model was producing 
errors, and that have to be addressed for further research. 
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LO3. The general ability to conceptualize, design and implement a project for the 
generation of new knowledge, applications or understanding at the forefront 
of the discipline, and to adjust the project design in the light of unforeseen 
problems. 
The project idea started from the observation of how powerful and damaging, a 
common user can be when they decide to harm the computer system. This idea 
was the starting point of the research as to what computer security is, and how 
it can be broken using the most conventional and common operating systems 
that exist on the market today, and why? The research also involved modelling 
typical user behaviour and actions, and how these can be quantified. After an 
extensive research on security, the conclusion was that many commercial oper-
ating systems have very little internal security, and implement very few 
methods to protect against potential threats. The methods that were employed 
were typically passive ones. This was the weakness that focused on the research 
seeking a method which could make security both active and adaptive.  
 The research also uses software agent technology, as this is the technology 
that is most suitable for distributed system applications. Software agents are 
robust and highly adoptable software entities and, if used correctly, have mini-
mum impact on the use of computational power, and memory usage of the 
system. 
 The research started on prediction systems, especially short-term predic-
tion, and their accuracy and response times. At first, it was decided that the 
prediction of the user behaviour, if broken down to simple parts, could be lin-
ear. Thus sophisticated and very computational consuming methods, like 
Neural Networks, could be replaced by simpler methods. From our research on 
prediction techniques, it was found that Bayesian statistics are more suitable 
for the statistical prediction model. Bayesian statistics produces a compact 
short-term prediction model, that is highly configurable, and almost mainte-
nance free. 
 Designing and determining the new technology was an important part of 
the project, but putting all the various parts together was another large task. 
The software environment used was Java-based, as it is highly versatile, and a 
platform independent programming language. It also provides ease-of-access 
to network programming, using the TCP and IP protocols.   
 The model started from the inner core, using key parts of the project:  the 
communication mechanism; the implementation of the prediction model; and 
the format of the messages that the agents use to exchange information.  After 
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finishing this implementation and after unit testing all the various parts, the 
system components were put together, and used to test the model.  
 
LO4. A detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and advanced 
academic inquiry. 
In this research project, many new ideas and technologies were used from dif-
ferent disciplines. For example, software agent technology was found to be the 
best technology for a distributed and secure environment. This involved re-
search into the different aspects of software agents, their applications, and the 
way that other researchers have implemented them. Software agents, and agent 
in general, are very new and research on them is growing. At an early stage of 
the research, we had to draw a logical conclusion on various questions for 
which  we could not find any answers, as there was no current research on the 
subject yet. 
 The research has studied different methods of network intrusion, which 
are typically not fully documented (as many organisation do not want intru-
sions into their network known), especially for internal intrusions.  
 The research also investigated user behaviour, and how to quantify user 
behaviour, so it can be compared and measured. As we are monitoring user be-
haviour there is obviously an ethical point of view. Thus, the benefits of 
increased security must have a benefit which over-rules the disadvantages of 
user monitoring. It is proposed that user behaviour would not be used in a 
normal network but would be applied, along with other methods, to a highly se-
cure network, especially in a government or military network.  
 Another element of the research was in the usage of statistics. For this, 
various statistical methods were investigated, and were evaluated for their ap-
plication to short-term prediction. For this, the research has to understand the 
differences on those systems, and how a statistical model could be used to 
overcome the problems these systems had. 
 We also researched the tools that we used to develop and test the project. 
This involved the comparison of the most common programming languages to 
determine which one was more suitable, and especially in terms of develop-
ment tools, books and papers, and feedback from the programming 
community. 
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1.6 A New Computer Era 
The availability of cheap and easy-to-find computing and networking technology has 
driven a large amount of people to get on-line and connect to Internet. In January 
1993 there were 1,313,000 connected to the Internet, while in January 2002 were more 
than 100,000,000 [1.1]. With this growth comes the problem of computer security, 
which has been a problem since the first BBS (Bulleting Board System). With this, 
there was a problem in safeguarding corporate information against users and organi-
sations who wish to abuse data, systems or users on networks. 
 Current security methods tend to be based on passwords, which are inherently 
weak. The system presented in this research uses a software agent and statistical pre-
diction techniques to detect and prevent unauthorised security breaches by internal 
users. The experimental results show that predicting the user moves can be the best 
solution of detecting and preventing a security breach, in a highly secure environ-
ment. 
 At present, computer security is a major worry for organisations, and this will con-
tinue as long as there is information, which can be stolen or damaged. The laws, 
which relates to this type of crime are still being developed, and will take some time 
to implement.  
 Many users think that the main problem relating to security is caused by external 
users (often known as hackers), but Carter and Catz [1.5] have shown that the primary 
threat comes from individuals inside an organisation. This observation results in the 
fact that much more emphasis has to be placed on internal control mechanisms of 
systems, such audit log analysis. A recent example is the Hotmail [1.6] security 
breach: 
 
Microsoft was informed on August 29, 1999, of a security loophole, which 
allowed anyone to read the Inbox of any Hotmail user provided the user-
name, was known (which is often relatively easy as many users advertise 
there Hotmail address). If its owner was not accessing the targeted ac-
count (also dependent on account settings), all other email functions were 
available (delete, forward and send). Reports varied on the duration of the 
vulnerability, but a Swedish newspaper informed Microsoft on Sunday 
morning, and Microsoft took its Hotmail gateway servers offline for a cou-
ple of hours on the Monday morning. Access to Hotmail was restored was 
soon, but several sources also reported in finding another vulnerable 
Hotmail server later in the day. By Monday evening, the vulnerability was 
removed. It is not clear how long the vulnerability was known before Sun-
day, but one source said it was known eight weeks before.  
 
It is obviously difficult to ever have a totally secure network which is totally secure 
against intrusion as differing types of intruders have differing financial budgets. Net-
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work administrators must know how secure there network is and the level of intru-
sion that would be required to compromise the network (Figure 1.3). At the lower 
layers, such as the home user and data mining professional, the budget is likely to be 
relatively low, and easy to protect against. At the upper levels, such as large-scale 
military and government activities, which have large budgets it is extremely difficult 
to guard against. 
 
Budget: £1000s
£100,000s
£10 millions
£100M
£100billions Large-scale military
Government activities
Industrial espionage
Professional
data mining 
Home
user 
Increasing difficulty to deal with
 
Figure 1.3 Varying budgets for intrusion 
In many cases, people that called themselves hackers [1.7] create security breaches. In 
the early days of intrusion, these intruders did it for self-projection and not to im-
prove their finances. Nowadays, there is a great deal to be gained from breaching 
system security, these individuals tend to be: 
 
• Professional programmers and IT specialists. They typically have extensive 
knowledge of the protocols and hardware that are used by organisations. It is also 
typical that they work in teams, and have some inside knowledge of the organisa-
tional systems. 
• Government agents. Typically, ex-military using advanced information warfare 
methods (such as CIA software agents [1.7]). For example, according to the Sun-
day Times on 4 August 1996, American intelligent agents have intruded into the 
computer of the European parliament and European commission as part of an in-
ternational espionage campaign aimed at stealing economic and political secrets. 
Countries, including China and Korea, have also been targeted by US secret 
agents, and it is likely that spies of the future will use electronic surveillance tech-
niques rather than traditional spying methods. 
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Coldwell [1.9] identifies that lone intruders often gain the headlines in newspapers 
(over 5000 intrusion attacks alone in the last decade in the USA, UK, Germany and 
Australia), but he argues that these are being used as ‘fall guys’ for a cover-up on 
computer fraud within organisations and through organised crime. 
 No security measure can ever guarantee a risk free environment, but increased se-
curity can make the system less easy-to-use. Many businesses require to grant access 
to some parts of their system and must make it easy to use, thus increasing potential 
exposure. In addition, the majority of people that want to be protected from intru-
sions rely on a specific security application that is, in most cases, a passive one, with 
no ability to adapt to the changes of the system that it protects. Proper security con-
trols require planning and careful implementation and in most cases are not simply 
installed as a security tool. Forestalling potential security breaches requires careful 
monitoring and management, and it is critical that these controls deter real prob-
lems. Threats change as fast as both technology and business. Adaptation and 
improvisation are the key features of a security system. No hardware or software ele-
ment can ever be immune from security weaknesses. 
Many organisations will typically rely on an operating system for system security. 
To provide a measure of how secure a system is, the US Government defines certain 
security levels: D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3 and A1, which are published in the Trusted Com-
puter Security Evaluation Criteria books (each of which has a different coloured cover 
to define their function). These include:   
 
• Orange book. Describes system security. 
• Red book. Interpretation of the Orange book in a network context. 
• Blue book. Application of Orange book to systems not covered in the original 
book. 
 
For example, Windows NT uses the C2 security level. It has the following features: 
 
• Object control. Users own certain objects and they have control over how they are 
accessed. 
• User names and passwords. These are unique user’s names, which are defined 
within groups, and have restricted access to objects. 
• No object reuse. Once a user or a group has been deleted, the user and group 
numerical IDs are not used again. New users or groups are granted a new ID 
number. 
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• Security auditing system. This allows the system administrator to trace security 
aspects, such as user login, bad logins, program access, file access, and so on. 
• Defined keystroke for system access. In Windows NT/2000/XP, the Ctrl-Alt-Del 
keystroke is used by a user to log into the system. 
1.7 Structure of this thesis 
The format of the thesis is as follows: 
 
• Chapter 1: Introduction. This provides an introduction of the thesis. It defines the 
motivation for the work, and how well the research has matched the learning out-
comes.  
• Chapter 2: Computer Security Issues.  This outlines the different techniques for 
intrusion and misuse of computer systems. It will highlight some of the most im-
portant and dangerous aspects of the computer security risks.  
• Chapter 3: Computer Network Security System. This outlines the usage of soft-
ware agents, and should give a basic understanding of what software agents are, 
and how they are used in a security model.  
• Chapter 4: Prediction Techniques. This deals with prediction methods, and gives 
a brief overview of statistical methods, and areas they most used. A particular fo-
cus will be on explaining Bayesian methods, as these are used in the proposed 
prediction model.  
• Chapter 5: Simple Tutorial on the Proposed Bayesian Method. This demon-
strates a short and simplified tutorial of the statistical method used in this 
research. The aim of this is to introduce to the reader to an easy example so they 
can understand how it works, and can understand the following chapters.  
• Chapter 6: Proposed Statistical Prediction Method. This covers the new statisti-
cal model that will be used in the proposed model. 
• Chapter 7: Software Agent Security System. This explains, in detail, the software 
agent system, the different parts it consists off, and how it works. 
• Chapter 8: Experiments. This outlines the different sets of experiments that were 
untaken.  
• Chapter 9: Results. This presents results of the experimentation, as compared 
with data from other statistical models. 
• Chapter 10: Conclusions. This is the final chapter and it deals with the main con-
clusions from the research, how successful it was, and proposes future research 
plans.
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2  Computer Security Issues   
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an understanding of the methods used by intruders in order to 
gain entry to a system, and outlines various methods that intruders use to break 
computer security, alongside some operating system weaknesses that intruders ex-
ploit to gain access to computer systems. Unfortunately, no system can ever be totally 
secure, even with the strongest of hardware and/or software protection. 
 Our contribution is focused on internal misuse of computer networks, and typi-
cally operates after the initial user authentication.  For this, many different 
techniques can be employed to tackle the same point of failure: the authentication 
phase. Our proposal deals with this condition when the user is authenticated cor-
rectly and allowed access to the network, but start to misbehave, either to damage to 
the network, or  become involved in actions against the rules of the organisation. 
2.2 Protecting networks 
Most users typically think that security only relates to the protection of data on user 
systems. From an organisational point-of-view, it encapsulates other area such as: 
 
• Data protection [2.1][2.2][2.3][2.4]. This is typically where sensitive or commer-
cially important information is kept. It might include information databases, 
design files or source code files. One method of reducing this risk is to encrypt 
important files with a password, and another is to  encrypt data with a secret elec-
tronic key (files are encrypted with a commonly known public-key, and decrypted 
with a secret key, which is known only by user who has the right to access the 
files).  
• Software protection [2.5][2.6]. This involves protecting all the software packages 
from damage or from being misconfigured. A misconfigured software package 
can cause as much damage as a physical attack on a system, because it can take a 
long time to find the problem. 
• Physical system protection [2.7][2.8][2.9]. This involves protecting systems from 
intruders who might physically attack the systems. Normally, important systems 
are locked in rooms and then within locked rack-mounted cabinets. 
• Transmission protection [2.10][2.11]. This involves an intruder tampering with a 
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transmission connection. It might involve tapping into a network connection or 
total disconnection. Tapping can be avoided by many methods, including using 
optical fibres, which are almost impossible to tap into (as it would typically in-
volve sawing through a cable with hundreds of fibre cables, which would each 
have to be reconnected as they were initially). Underground cables can avoid total 
disconnection, or its damage can be reduced by having redundant paths (such as 
different connections to the Internet). 
 
Security is one of the major issues in any network and on the Internet. It encapsulates 
many different areas, from protecting individual users against intruders, to protecting 
corporate systems against damage. It is impossible to ever make a network totally se-
cure, as there are many areas which must be protected. The most important, 
obviously, is to keep networking equipment in a secure environment. Figure 1.1 pre-
viously outlined some of the methods which could be used to protect a network at 
each of the layers of the OSI model. The physical protection of a network can involve 
using fibre cables instead of copper ones, as copper cables leak electromagnetic ra-
diation, which can be used to tap into the communications. At the next layer (the 
Data Link Layer) a VLAN can be used to limit the transmission of data with a net-
work. With a VLAN is it difficult for an intruder to tap into a network, unless than can 
configure the ports of the switch in which the VLAN connects to. In addition, network 
switches allow for point-to-point communications methods, where only the two de-
vices communicating will be able to listen to the communications. This differs from a 
traditional Ethernet type network, which uses a bus topology where any device on the 
network can listen to the communications on the bus.  
 At the next layer (the Network Layer), firewalls are implemented on a router to de-
fine a security policy, for the network addresses and port which are allowed to flow 
into and out of a network. In a highly secure network, there is typically only one gate-
way into the network. This gateway operates the global security policy for the 
complete network. Along with this, there are other firewalls which implement local-
ised security policy. Cisco Systems present a three-tiered architecture for network, 
where the lowest layer provides the connectivity, and is typically implemented by 
switches. The network layer above this implements the distribution layer, which in-
terconnects networks using routers. These routers implement the security policies 
between workgroups. At the very centre of the network, there is the core element, 
which provides interconnectivity across a wide area. 
 Above this (at the Transport Layer), secure sockets can be used, which use en-
crypted information to pass data segments. At the Session Layer, messages can be 
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encrypted using protocols, such as S-HTTP [2.12]. Finally, the data itself can be en-
crypted using a public- or private-key encryption scheme, such as RSA [2.13] or PGP 
[2.14]. The earlier that the data is encrypted the better, as even if an intruder can read 
the information at the other levels, they will find it difficult to recover the original 
data (normally only by brute force, or by time-based attacks). Details, though, given 
at the various layers could give some information on the data interchange. For exam-
ple, an intruder might be able to determine the source and destination network 
addresses from the data packets, which could be used to the intruders benefit. A new 
technique called Network Address Translation (NAT) can be used at the network layer 
to hide IP addresses from intruders. With this, the NAT translates internal addresses 
into a generic address. It does this by remembering the connection that was made, 
especially the destination network address, and the source and destination ports. 
 A firewall is the routing computer, which isolates the intranet from the outside 
world. Another method is to use an intermediate system, which isolates the intranet 
from the external Internet. These intermediate systems include proxies and tunnels. 
A proxy acts on behalf of clients and sends requests from clients to a server. It thus 
acts as a client when it communicates with a server, but as a server when communi-
cating with a client. A proxy is typically used for security purposes where the client 
and server are separated by a firewall. The proxy connects to the client side of the 
firewall and the server to the other side of the firewall. Thus, the server must authen-
ticate itself to the firewall before a connection can be made with the proxy. Only after 
this has been authenticated will the proxy pass requests through the firewall. A proxy 
can also be used to convert between different versions of the protocols that use 
TCP/IP, such as HTTP. Each intermediate system is connected by TCP and acts as a 
relay for the request to be sent out and returned to the client.  
 The data link and physical layers are typically protected with physical methods, 
such as basing security on the physical address of networked devices, and on limiting 
physical access to the devices. At the network and transport layers, advanced firewalls 
and authentication servers can be setup to limit intruders.  
 Major elements of security are authentication, authorization, and accounting 
(AAA). These allow for enhanced security for who is allowed to log into a network, 
what they are allowed to do, and logs the things that they have done. Typically this 
security is applied at the edge of a network, using a network access server (NAS). 
These servers must use a secure protocol in order for a host to communicate with a 
specialised security server. This server contains a database of the users and their as-
sociated passwords, and any other configurations. On routers, there are three main 
security protocols: 
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• TACACS+ [2.15]. This system uses a centralised validation of users. It maintains a 
database, which is a TACACS+ daemon running on a host computer, and provides 
for individual configuration of authentication, authorization, and accounting.  
• RADIUS . This is a distributed client/server system. It is an open-standard and is 
specified in RFCs 2865, 2866, and 2868. With RADIUS, a client typically runs on a 
router, which sends authentication requests to a centralized RADIUS server.  
• Kerberos [2.16]. This uses a secret-key encryption authentication method, but 
does not allow for authorization or accounting. It was designed to provide au-
thentication, where a third party authenticates each of the parties to the other. 
For this, a trusted Kerberos server provides authentication tickets to users, which 
have a limited life.  
The Authentication Problem 
Often security systems base themselves on authentication, which is the process of de-
termining whether an object (such as a user, a hardware device or a software 
component) is, in fact, the object that they are declared to be. In private and public 
computer networks, including the Internet, authentication is commonly achieved 
through the use of logon passwords [2.17]. 
 Passwords are typically implemented at the session layer of the OSI model, and are 
one of the weakest areas for a point of network intrusion. The best protection at the 
layers of the OSI model, such as firewall protection, data encryption, and physical 
security will count for very little if a user’s password has been breached. It is well 
known that reusable passwords have traditionally been the weakest link in host 
security, and are often poorly chosen and therefore easy to guess. It is also the case 
that password databases, such as ones used in Microsoft Windows and in Unix, are 
poorly protected, and are typically based on hash methods, which can be easily 
broken with exhaustive search techniques. In recent years the reusable password has 
become a favourite target for network eavesdroppers [2.18], and passive monitoring 
of shared networks is undetectable. It has thus become easier as computing trends 
have favored small, single-user workstations that give many users privileged network 
access. Since passwords are often be sent in the clear, they can be easily captured by 
eavesdroppers and used at a later time for network intrusions. Intruders often leave 
behind automated sniffer programs so that they can harvest passwords for later use.  
 Some systems can use Kerberos encryption for all sensitive network traffic, and foil 
both active and passive attacks. But the user is required to use only kerberized hosts 
to participate, thus remote logins over an unprotected link or from terminals are still 
vulnerable. This problem also exists with other application-level encryption protocols 
like SSH. They are well protected tools and should be used when available, but in 
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many situations they are either unavailable or inconvenient.  
 One-time passwords (OTP) are another convenient way to solve this problem, as 
they allow users to be authenticated over insecure links without revealing any 
sensitive information. As the name implies, a one-time password is only good for one 
authentication session, after which it automatically expires, and a new (previously 
unused) password becomes valid. OTP schemes are less secure than Kerberos and 
SSH in that they only provide protection against passive attacks. On the other hand 
OTPs are more flexible than Kerberos and provide most of the protection required, as 
passive attacks are the most common and the hardest to detect.  
 The disadvantage with OTP schemes, is that they require the use of hand-held 
authenticators or smart cards to participate in cryptographic challenge/response 
dialogues with a remote host. With small numbers of users such a system may be 
feasible, but at large sites, the prospect of arming everyone with expensive smart-
cards is daunting and undesirable. 
Inside attacks 
Inside attacks are the most common way of attacking a computer. The advantage of 
this way of attack is that the intruder is authorized for the system that they are attack-
ing, so the authentication is not an object. One common solution to this attack is to 
monitor every action of the user [2.19]. This monitoring typically uses automatated 
software that is static, and is too complicated to install and maintain. It may not 
always make the right decisions, and the results often raise the wrong alert flags. 
Another disadvantage is that constant monitoring of the users, creates a correspond-
ing decline in creativity and productivity. 
2.3 Security loopholes 
Software always has inefficiencies known as software bugs. System administrators 
and programmers cannot track down and eliminate all possible holes, and intruders 
can often use these to find a security hole to break in to [2.1]. Software inefficiencies 
are exploited in the: server daemons; the client applications; the operating system: 
and the network stack. Software bugs, which could allow intruders into a system, can 
be classified in the following manner: 
 
• Buffer overflows. Most of the security holes that occur are due to buffer overflows 
For example a programmer may reserve up to 256 characters to hold a login user-
name, as they assume that no-one will ever have a login name which is larger than 
this limit. Unfortunately, this is an opportunity for an intruder to send more than 
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256 characters, which may cause the system to act unreliably and allow the in-
truder into the system. Intruders can find these loopholes by either examining the 
source code of the system and then search it for any security loopholes. They may 
also look at the machine code of the program, or may even examine every place 
the program has input and try to overflow it with random data. If the program 
crashes, there is a good chance that carefully constructed input will allow the in-
truder to break in. Note that this problem is common in programs written in 
C/C++, but rare in programs written in Java (as Java has a dynamic allocation of 
arrays, and has automated garbage collection, which frees the memory of arrays 
which are not used any more).  
• Unexpected combinations. Programs are usually constructed using many layers 
of code, including the underlying operating system as the bottom most layer. In-
truders can often send input that is meaningless to one layer, but meaningful to 
another layer. The most common language for processing user input on the 
WWW is PERL, which normally sends this input to other programs for further 
evaluation. A common intrusion technique would be to enter something like “| 
mail < /etc/passwd”. This is executed because PERL asks the operating system to 
launch an additional program with that input. However, the operating system in-
tercepts the pipe ‘|’ character and launches the ‘mail’ program as well, which 
causes the password file to be emailed to the intruder. 
• Unhandled input. Most programs are written to handle valid input, but many 
programmers do not consider what happens when somebody enters input that 
does not match the specification (such as entering invalid characters). 
• Race conditions. Most systems today are multitasking and multithreaded. This 
means that they can execute more than one program at a time. With this, there is 
always a danger that if two programs need to access the same data they will access 
it at the same time. Imagine two programs, A and B, who need to modify the same 
file. In order to modify a file, each program must first read the file into memory, 
change the contents in memory, and then copy the memory back out into the file. 
A race condition occurs when program A reads the file into memory, then makes 
the change. However, before A gets to write the file, program B steps in and does 
the full read/modify/write on the file. Now program A write its copy back out to 
the file. Since program A started with a copy before B made its changes, all of B’s 
changes will be lost. Since you need to get the sequence of events in just the right 
order, race conditions are very rare. Intruders normally have to try many times 
before they get it right, and are able to intrude into the system. 
 
While many of the lower layers of the OSI model now are fairly well protected against 
intruders, the layers above these provide many of the major problems. This typically 
occurs with operating systems problems, and email and Internet browser problems, 
especially related to electronic worms. For example, Microsoft identified that there 
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were security vulnerabilities in two ActiveX controls (scriptlet.typelib and Eyedog), 
which allowed a web page to take unauthorized action against a person who visited it. 
Specifically, the web page would be able to do anything on the computer that the 
user could do. This security breach was used to spread a worm, as it allowed the Ac-
tive X controls to be marked as safe for scripting, and can therefore be called by 
Internet Explorer. Both these controls have rather benign uses, but someone deter-
mined could create a worm, which could easily spread through the Internet.  
 Wilson [2.27] outlines that many intruders make use of vulnerabilities available to 
them, and he argues that managers in the government and private sector organisa-
tions should be more accountable for updating their systems with the latest operating 
systems fixes.  
2.4 System configuration 
No software system is ever completely free of bugs, or properly configured. Unfortu-
nately, software developers have made software more complex, and have generally 
focused on adding applications, rather than focussing on software reliability. After a 
series of embarrassing bugs in Microsoft Windows, Chris Mason at Microsoft puts it 
into context with: 
 
“Since human beings themselves are not fully debugged yet, there will be bugs 
in the code no matter what you do”,  
“We could conceivably put a company out of business with a bug in a spread-
sheet, database, or word processor”,  
 
Thus like any man-made system, there are likely to be weaknesses in it, which the 
human did not envisage.  
 System configuration bugs can be classified in the following manner: 
 
• Default configurations. Most systems are shipped to customers with default, 
easy-to-use configurations. Unfortunately, easy-to-use typically means easy-to-
break-in. Almost all Unix or Microsoft Windows computers which are initially in-
stalled can be easily intruded into. 
• Lazy administrators. A surprising number of machines are configured with an 
empty root/administrator password. This is because the administrator is too lazy 
to configure one and wants to get the machine up and running as quickly as pos-
sible, with the minimum of fuss. Unfortunately, they never get around to fixing 
the password later, allowing intruders easy access. One of the first things an in-
truder will do on a network is to scan all machines for empty passwords. 
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• Hole creation. Virtually all programs can be configured to run in a non-secure 
mode. Sometimes administrators will inadvertently open a hole on a machine, 
such as a TELNET or FTP server connection. Most administration guides will sug-
gest that administrators turn off everything that does not positively need to run 
on a machine in order to avoid accidental holes. Note that security-auditing pack-
ages can usually find these holes and notify the administrator. 
• Trust relationships. Intruders often island hop through the network exploiting 
trust relationships. A network of machines trusting each other is only as secure as 
its weakest link. 
2.5 Password cracking 
Password cracking is the most common method of intruders trying to break in to a 
computer network and is a special category all to itself. It is an important area as 
passwords are typically used at the authentication layer for the session layer. Reasons 
intruders achieve their target are the following: 
 
• Weak passwords. Most people use the names of themselves, their children, the 
spouse, the pet, or their car model as their password. There are also users who 
choose password or simple stay with a default password name (or even do not 
have a password at all). This gives a reduced list of possibilities that an intruder 
can try. If these possibilities are entered over a relatively long time period, the sys-
tem would not report any errors for incorrect entry of a users’ password. 
• Dictionary attacks. Failing the above attack, the intruder can next try a dictionary 
attack. In this attack, the intruder uses a program, which tries every possible word 
in the dictionary. Dictionary attacks can be done either by repeatedly logging into 
systems or by collecting encrypted passwords and attempting to find a match by 
similarly encrypting all the passwords in the dictionary. Intruders normally have a 
copy of the English dictionary as well as foreign language dictionaries for this 
purpose. They all use additional dictionary-like databases, such as common 
names (as in weak passwords) and lists of common passwords. Passwords are also 
built using a concatenation of common names (such as frogcar). Some systems 
overcome this by informing the user that they are using a password which is 
formed with words from a dictionary (and may even bar the user from selecting 
that password). 
• Brute force attacks. This is similar to the Dictionary attack, but the intruder tries 
all possible combinations of characters. This is relatively easy with short pass-
words, but difficult with long ones. For example a short 4-letter password 
consisting of lower-case letters can be cracked in just a few minutes (roughly, half 
a million possible combinations), whereas a 7-character password consisting of 
upper and lower case, as well as numbers and punctuation (which gives 10 trillion 
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combinations) can take months to crack assuming that the system can try a mil-
lion combinations a second (in practice, a thousand combinations per second is 
more likely for a single machine). 
 
In most networked systems, administrators force users to change password every six 
months a year. Most of the time the user will actually select the same password, 
which makes it easier for the intruder to get into the system as they intrude into the 
computer system once and copy the encrypted password file that the operating sys-
tem manufacturer predefines its location. In most cases, intruders use more than one 
computer to decrypt the password file. Once they have the password, they can login 
like normal computer user and examine the computer system or copy information, 
depending of the security clearance level that the stolen user data have. 
2.6 Internet security problems 
The Internet can cause a great deal of problems as it can allow open access for exter-
nal users. Typical attacks include: 
 
• E-mail bombing. This is where an external user(s) continually send an identical e-
mail message to a particular address. E-mail spamming is a variant of this, where 
the same message is sent to many users, at a single time. This is made worse if the 
recipient actually responds back to the e-mail spamming message using all the 
recipients on the address list, as this will also flood the network with unwanted e-
mail messages. E-mail bombing without the permission of the user is illegal in 
many countries and there should always be a message on the e-mail message 
which identifies the method that can be used to delete a user’s name from an e-
mail bombing database. 
• E-mail spoofing. This is where external users setup incorrect e-mail addresses, 
and then send e-mails to other users. This could be either to cloak the identity of 
the person, or to try to pretend to be another known person. On a personal level, 
when pretending to be another person, this can be particularly disturbing, as 
many users think that the e-mail address in the From: field is always from that 
person. The cloaking is typically used with e-mail bombing, where a false user 
name is used to send e-mail bombs.  
• Denial of service (DOS) attacks. These are severe attaches where external users 
continually try and access a server, typically a WWW server, an email server or 
network routers, and try to slow it down to the point that no-one else can access 
it.  Unlike many other attacks there is very little that can be done about it, apart 
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from tracing the source, and trying to block the transmissions. 
2.7 Network attacks 
Typical network attacks can be categorised as [2.21] for external attacks are: 
 
• IP spoofing attacks [2.22][2.23]. This is where the intruder steals an authorized IP 
address. Typically, it is done by determining the IP address of a computer and 
waiting until there is no one using that computer, and then using the unused IP 
address. Several users have been accused of accessing unauthorized material be-
cause others have used their IP address. A login system which monitors IP 
addresses and the files that they are accessing over the Internet cannot be used as 
evidence against the user, as it is easy to steal IP addresses. 
• Packet-sniffing [2.24]. This is where the intruder listens to TCP/IP packets which 
come out of the network and steals the information in them. Typical information 
includes user logins, e-mail messages, credit card number, and so on. This 
method is typically used to steal an IP address, before an IP spoofing attack. Most 
TELNET and FTP programs actually transmit the user name and password as  text  
values;  these  can  be easily viewed by an intruder. 
• Sequence number prediction attacks. Initially, in a TCP/IP connection, the two 
computers exchange a start-up packet which contains sequence numbers. These 
sequence numbers are based on the computer’s system clock and then run in a 
predictable manner, which can be determined by the intruder. 
• Trust-access attacks. This allows an intruder to add their system to the list of sys-
tems, these are then allowed to log into the system without a user password. In 
UNIX this file is the .rhosts (trusted hosts) which is contained in the user’s home 
directory. A major problem is when the trusted hosts file is contained in the root 
directory, as this allows a user to log in as the system administrator. 
 
For internal abuse attacks: 
 
• Passwords attack. This is a common weak-point in any system, and intruders will 
generally either find a user with an easy password (especially users which have 
the same password as their login name) or will use a special program which cycles 
through a range of passwords. This type of attack is normally easy to detect. The 
worst case of this type of attack is when an intruder determines the system ad-
ministrator password (or a user who has system privileges). This allows the 
intruder to change system set-ups, delete files, and even change user passwords. 
• Session hi-jacking attacks. In this method, the intruder taps into a connection 
between two computers, typically between a client and a server. The intruder 
then simulates the connection by using its IP address. 
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• Shared library attacks. Many systems have an area of shared library files. These 
are called by applications when they are required (for input/output, networking, 
graphics, and so on). An intruder may replace standard libraries for ones that 
have been tampered with, which allows the intruder to access system files and to 
change file privileges. The intruder might tamper with dynamic libraries (which 
are called as a program runs), or with static libraries (which are used when com-
piling a program). This would allow the intruder to possibly do damage to the 
local computer, send all communications to a remote computer, or even view 
everything that is viewed on the user screen. The intruder could also introduce vi-
ruses and cause unpredictable damage to the computer (such as remotely 
rebooting it, or crashing it at given times). 
• Social engineering attacks. This type of attack is aimed at users who have little 
understanding of their computer system. A typical attack is where the intruder 
sends an email message to a user, asking for their password. Many unknowing us-
ers are tricked by this attack. From the initial user login, the intruder can then 
access the system and further invade the system. In one research study it was 
found that when telephoned by an unknown person and asked what their pass-
word was, 90% of users immediately gave it, without asking any questions. 
• Technological vulnerability attack. This normally involves attacking some part of 
the system (typically the operating system), which allows an intruder to access the 
system. A typical one is for the user to gain access to a system and then run a pro-
gram, which reboots the system or slows it down by running a processor intensive 
program. This can be overcome in operating systems such as Microsoft Windows 
and UNIX by granting re-boot rights only to the system administrator. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed some of the implications of computer security. We saw 
that there are many ways in which intruders can harm a computer system. Some 
times, it is weaknesses of the operating system, or of the security software packages 
configuration, or human error. Especially, when there are large numbers of computer 
users, and the logs created for monitoring these users are very large, most often the 
logs are examined after a breach of system security. 
Another conclusion that we can draw from this chapter is that pre-emptive action 
against computer misuse is a method that can deliver maximum-security effects, if 
substantiated with correct evidence. 
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3  Computer Network Security Systems  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes software agent technology related to security. It provides an 
outline of software agents, and how they are used in current research. As previously 
mentioned, network security has become a major issue, especially when connecting 
through interconnected networks. Computer network security programs can be cate-
gorised as follows [3.9]: 
 
• Security enhancement software. This enhances or replaces an operating system’s 
built-in security software (such as with Mangle It, Passwd+ [3.45] and Shadow 
[3.46]).  
• Authentication and encryption software. This encrypts and decrypts computer 
files (such as with Kerberos [3.47, 3.48], MD5 [3.49], RIPEM, and TIS Firewall Tool-
kit [3.50]). 
• Security monitoring software monitor. This monitors different operations of a 
computer network and outputs the results to system administrators (such as with 
Abacus Sentry [3.50, 3.51], COPS [3.52], Tripwire [3.53] and Tiger). 
• Network monitoring software. This monitors user’s behaviour or monitors in-
coming or outgoing traffic (such as with Argus, Arpwatch [3.54] and ISS). 
• Firewall software and hardware. This runs on the Internet/intranet gateway of a 
network, and checks all incoming network traffic for its contents at the network 
and transport layers of the OSI model. At the network layer, typically the Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses are filtered for their source and/or destination, and at the 
transport layer, the TCP ports and monitored (thus FTP and TELNET traffic could 
be blocked for incoming data traffic, but SMTP (electronic mail) could be al-
lowed). 
 
These methods are generally centralised and have very little real-time response. Thus, 
they have no prediction to foresee future user events.   The methods outlined also 
tend to have a central focal point for the security (typically a main server), which 
could itself become the focus of an attack (such as a denial-of-service attack). The se-
curity methods involved in this research are focused on distribution, where the 
system does not depend on a central point of failure. It also gathers user behavioural 
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information and based on this, it makes a prediction on what the user might do in the 
future. 
 A firewall, for example, can implement filtering on IP addresses, and ports, but can 
also define TCP and UDP idle timeout values and DNS timeouts. This is mainly be-
cause multiple connections can be used in Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks. Along 
with this, the router can define limits for DoS attack thresholds, such as defining the 
limits for triggering the deletion of existing half-open sessions. This can be defined as 
a one-minute session threshold, or the maximum number of incomplete sessions. 
The firewall, for all its power in filtering data, is only using fixed rules, which are im-
plemented in an efficient manner. It cannot foresee events that will occur, and are 
typically only responding to previously known attacks. 
 In choosing a combination of network security programs, the dominant issues are: 
cost; the desired level of security; and the characteristics of the existing operating sys-
tem environment. Three mechanisms for illegal behaviour detection are commonly 
used in computer network security programs [3.9]: 
 
• Statistical anomaly detection [3.64]. Many secure systems, such as standard net-
work operating systems and routers, support an audit log, which can store events 
on applications, security options and on general system properties, and whether 
they are successful or not. In statistical anomaly detection, the data in these logs 
can be used to detect network intrusion patterns. 
• Rule-based detection. These systems use rules to define illegal behaviour. A fire-
wall is basically a rules-based system, which routes based on these filtering rules. 
If a data packet fails one of the rules, it is deleted from the network. A rules-based 
system is easy to implement as it can typically relate directly to the security policy 
of the network. Humans understand rules, and are comfortable with the idea of 
computer-based systems operating on a fixed set of rules, of which they cannot 
detour from. Jha and Hussan [3.65] use agents to detect an intrusion based on 
pre-defined rules. The agent then informs the systems manager, and blocks any 
further intrusion. They also use a reactionary approach where a separate host-
based agent checks log files in order to detect system anomalies caused by suc-
cessful attacks. Their system is thus defined as pre-emptory and reactionary. 
• Hybrid detection. This is an amalgamation of statistical anomaly detection and 
rule-based detection. 
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3.1.1 Statistical anomaly detection 
Statistical anomaly detection systems analyse audit-log data to detect abnormal be-
haviour. A profile of expected online behaviour for a normal user is predefined and 
derived from how an organisation expects a user to behave, and from a system ad-
ministrator’s experience, of the way a user is expected to use system resources. The 
audit logs are analysed and processed for statistical patterns of events for typical op-
erations from which to determine usage patterns. These patterns are compared to the 
user’s profile. 
 Anderson [3.10] led a project called Safeguard, which adapted the NIDES statistical 
anomaly-detection subsystem, which profiled the behaviour of individual applica-
tions. Statistical measures were then used to determine the proper usage of an 
application, and what differentiates this from inappropriate usage. With Safeguard, a 
statistical score is assigned to the operation of applications and represents the degree 
to which current behaviour of the application corresponds to its established opera-
tional pattern. This demonstrated the ability of statistical profiling tools and 
differentiates the scope of execution from general-purpose applications. It also high-
lighted that statistical analysis could be effective in analysing activities other than 
individual users, such as the monitoring applications, rather than the users. The Safe-
guard analysis greatly reduces the required number of profiles and computational 
requirements, and the number of typical false-positives to false-negatives security 
breaches. These results suggest the possible usage of performing statistical analyses 
on activities at higher layers of abstraction. The system warns administrators that 
there has been a possible intrusion when a profile is different to a usage pattern. The 
major drawback with this technique is that it cannot predict extreme changes in user 
behaviour, which is unfortunate, as changes in a user’s behaviour could identify a se-
curity breach. It is well known that organisations can often identify users who are 
committing a fraudulent act within the organisation when they change the behaviour 
[3.42], such as working different hours, or using differing types of applications. Adair  
[3.42] highlights that organisations must implement seven basic defence mechanisms 
to overcome fraud: 
 
• Physical security. This includes locking equipment, especially servers and net-
working equipment, and setting up alarm systems. 
• Personnel security. Staff should be employed whose main responsibility is to 
keep data and systems secure. This should also involve security being built into 
the design, implementation and maintenance of systems. There is typically weak-
nesses in systems which have not has security built into it at the design stage, and 
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often security can be seen as an after-thought. 
• Encryption of sensitive data. 
• Technical surveillance inspection. 
• Line security. 
• Suppression of compromising emanations. This includes shielding of computer 
equipment. 
• System security. This includes software access control, logging mechanisms and 
authentication controls. 
 
If possible, all of these should be implemented in a highly secure environment. Willi-
son [3.43] advances the argument, that organisations must implement a preventative 
approach to reduce the dangers of fraud. For this, he recommends that crime-specific 
opportunity structures can be created which conceptualise a fraud environment. A 
key element of this is changes in a user’s normal behaviour. 
 Heatley et al. [3.44] recommend the technique of data mining computer audit logs 
to detect computer misuse, in terms of computer fraud, information theft, software 
privacy, and violations of privacy.  In this, the authors argue that the access of files 
can be monitored to identify fraud, such as: 
 
• Access to sensitive files. This relates to a class of sensitive files which can be de-
fined as the subject of improper access. In a networked environment, these might 
relate to important password or user information, such as password databases. 
• Access to random files. This relates to the selection of files using a random proc-
ess.  
• Access relating to groups of users. This defines the probability that a user-
selected file is from the sensitive class, is the same for all the member of a group of 
users.  
3.1.2 Rules based detection 
Rules based detection systems use a set of rules that define typical illegal user behav-
iour. These rules are formed by analysing previous patterns of attack, and analyses 
the audit-log data of a particular user and compares it with the rules. The drawback of 
this system is that the basic rules are predefined by system administrators, and can-
not detect any new attack techniques. If a user exhibits behaviour that is not 
prescribed by the existing rules, the user can harm the system without being de-
tected. 
 IDES [3.11] is security enhancement software that stores knowledge about a sys-
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tem’s known vulnerabilities, its security policies and information on previous intru-
sions. The information it uses to determine the network state is limited to the data 
packet header. As it does not examine the contents of the data packet, it may miss 
critical information about the nature of the data that goes through the network. It 
also scales poorly, especially where there are many machines on a high-speed net-
work. 
 A Kumar and Spafford enhancement [3.13] uses pattern matching, as attacks can 
be classified as patterns, which are matched against occurrences (the status of the 
system at that moment) in the system. These patterns can encode dependencies be-
tween system conditions and temporal conditions. Crosbie and Spafford use 
autonomous agents [3.14], which are trained to detect anomalous activity in network 
system traffic. A drawback of this approach is that the system requires considerable 
training by a human operator before it becomes effective. 
3.1.3 Hybrid detection 
Hybrid detection systems are a combination of statistical anomaly detection and 
rule-based detection systems. Typically, these use rules to detect known methods of 
intrusion and statistical based methods to detect new methods of intrusion, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.1. 
 CMDS (Computer Misuse Detection System) [3.15] is a security-monitoring pack-
age that provides a method to watch for intrusions. It detects and thwarts attempted 
logins, file modifications, Trojan horse installation, changes in administrative con-
figurations and many other signs of intrusion. In addition, it constantly monitors for 
difficult detection problems like socially engineered passwords, trusted user file 
browsing and data theft that might indicate industrial espionage. CMDS supports a 
wide variety of operating systems and application programs. The drawback of this 
system is that it uses statistical analysis to make additional rules for the system. This 
is a drawback, as it can only detect attack patterns that have been used in the past 
and that have been identified as attack patterns, or predefined by the system opera-
tors. It also generates long reports and graphs of the system performance that 
requires to be interpreted by a security expert.  
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Statistical anomaly  
detection
Good to detect new methods 
of  attack
Rule-based detection
Good in detecting known 
methods of intrusion
 
Figure 3.1: Statistical anomaly and rule-based detection 
3.2 Software agents 
Agents are programs which automate user tasks [3.1, 3.3], and have great potential in 
the development of mobile and distributed computing. Every agent satisfies the 
following four properties: reactive, autonomous, goal-oriented and temporally 
continuous, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. White [3.3] has defined software agents as 
automated tasks that otherwise we would have to do ourselves. He also distinguishes 
agents from other utility software programs by both the ability to perform in distrib-
uted computing environments and the ability to supply some domain knowledge to 
automating tasks for users.  
 
Reactive Responds in a 
timely fashion to changes in 
the environment.
Autonomous Exercises 
control over its own actions.
Goal-oriented Does not 
simply act in response to the 
environment. 
Temporally continuous
Is a continually running 
process. 
Communicative
Communicates with other 
agents, perhaps including 
people. 
Learning Changes its 
behaviour based on previous 
experience. 
Mobile Able to transport 
itself from one machine to 
another. 
Flexible Actions are not 
scripted 
 
Figure 3.2: Agent properties 
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Simple agent definitions include: 
 
• Co-operative agents. These agents communicate with each other, and react to 
their environment. An agent's view of its environment would thus be very narrow, 
as it has limited sensors. Co-operation between agents thus exists when the ac-
tions of an agent achieves not only the agent's goals, but also the goals of other 
agents. An example of this in a computer system is in the creation of a word proc-
essor which uses a spell checking agent, a grammar checking agent and a text 
layout agent. Each of the agents only senses their own environment and has a lim-
ited viewpoint of the overall system, but together they intercommunicate to 
enhance the goals of the complete system. 
• Reactive agents. These agents, like humans, are event-driven, and do not possess 
internal models of their environment. Instead, they react to a stimulus or an input 
that is governed by an event within its environment. This environmental event 
triggers a reaction or response from the agent. In the human body, an example of 
this is in the immune system which sends out lymphocytes when the body is at-
tacks by a foreign body.  
• Weak agents. Wooldridge suggests that weak agents are autonomous, and thus 
have control over their own actions and states. They also have some form of social 
interaction, either with humans or other agents using an agent-communication 
language. These agents also react and respond to their environment through 
sensing and perceiving the changes in the physical world, and display active 
knowledge of their goal through their actions. A good example of this, in a com-
puter network, is where agents are built into networking devices and 
communicate using the SNMP protocol. These agents work autonomously and 
gather information, which they can then report to other network agents, or to 
human operators. An SNMP agent will typically monitor network traffic, network 
faults, and so on. 
• Strong agents. Maes' defines interface agents as ‘computer programs that employ 
Artificial Intelligence to provide active assistance to a user with computer-based 
tasks.’ Maes' research utilized existing applications and connected them to a 
learning interface agent, which gradually built a knowledge base of what the hu-
man operator may do in certain situations. It is desirable that an agent should 
exhibit a learning potential to improve its decision-making methods. 
• Mobile agents. Mobile Agents are software processes capable of moving around 
networks such as the Internet, interacting with other hosts, gathering information 
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on behalf of their owner, and returning with any information that was requested 
by the owner. Mobility is another way that agents can be classified, that is being 
either a static agent or mobile agent. A static agent stays on the system it was in-
stalled on, whereas a mobile agent can move its location. Mobile agents thus have 
to be able stop their execution in order to move around a network, and only con-
tinue executing when they arrive at a host capable of re-starting code. The 
suspension of execution is a serious disadvantage of mobile agents. A static agent 
on the other hand has the ability to execute other tasks while it is communicating 
with other static agents. Its execution never has to stop. Mobile agents, unfortu-
nately, suffer from many security problems, especially in authenticating 
themselves to a receiving device, and vice-versa.  Once these problems have been 
overcome, mobile agents may provide the ultimate in distributed systems, where 
programs can actually migrate themselves to the place that the communication 
takes place, rather than communicating over the network. The research in this 
thesis is based on static agents, who do not move around the network, and com-
municate using traditional client-server architectures. 
 
Naylor et al. [3.4] have argued that agents are the next natural step in the develop-
ment of distributed systems. Their great advantage is that they are designed to run 
over distributed computing systems, whereas traditional utility programs typically 
run on a peer-to-peer type connection. They are particularly useful when working 
remotely from a server (especially when there is no current network connection), and 
for processing data that can be presented in a convenient form.  Agent-based systems 
also create more robust, and distributed, software environments. This is because 
agents can be written so that they only have a single goal, and the code can be de-
signed around that code. Most software is now written with multiple goals, and the 
larger the software becomes the more bugs it tends to have. Agent-based systems can 
be likened to embedded systems development, where software entities are carefully 
crafted in terms of processing requirements, memory usage, and so on. 
 A major problem with agent technologies is that there has previous been few de-
fined standards for their implementation and intercommunication. This is now being 
overcome with the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) [3.7] which has 
approved certain standards for agent communication. Many agents that are now be-
ing created comply with the standards generated by the FIPA. This research has not 
implemented these standards, as the objective of the research is to investigate a novel 
distributed security mechanism. The agents developed could be easily modified so 
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that they could communicate using the FIPA standards. 
 The requirement for agent standards and in applying them to real-life applications 
has been highlighted with the EU-sponsored FACTS project [3.55, 3.56]. FACTS in-
volved commercial organisations such as BT, Alcatel, BELL and Nortel, and academic 
organisation such as Imperial College (UK) and the Insituto Tertino di Cultura (Italy).  
 
3.3 Software agents and their use for security                           
enhancement 
There are several security systems which use agent technology as a tool for detecting 
abnormal behaviour in a network. They use different security issues and adapt to the 
dynamic networking environment, such as: 
 
• Intrusion Detection Inter-component Adaptive Negotiation (IDIAN) [3.17]. This 
project developed a negotiation protocol to allow a distributed collection of het-
erogeneous IDs to inter-operate and reach agreement on each other’s capabilities 
and needs. Moreover, the negotiation is dynamic so the information generated 
and processed can evolve as the Intrusion Detection System IDS evolves for envi-
ronment changes. 
• Adaptive Intrusion Detection (AID) system [3.18]. This is an ongoing at the Bran-
denburg University of Technology at Cottbus. The system is designed for network 
audit-based monitoring of local area networks and is used for to investigate net-
works and privacy-oriented auditing. AID has a client-server architecture 
consisting of a central monitoring station and several agents (servers) on the 
monitored hosts. The central station hosts a manager (client) and an expert sys-
tem. The agents then take the audit data that is collected by the local audit 
functions and converts it into an operating system independent format. This then 
allows for the monitoring of a heterogeneous UNIX environment. Next, the audit 
data is transferred to the central monitoring station, and is buffered in a cache 
and then analysed by an Rtworks-based real-time expert system [3.57]. Finally, 
the system manager provides functions for the security administration of the 
monitored hosts, and controls audit functions. It also requests new audit data by 
controlled polling and returns the decisions of the agent’s expert system. Secure 
RPC (Remote Procedure Call) allows for the communication between the man-
ager and the agents. The expert system uses a knowledge base with state-oriented 
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attack signatures, which are modelled by deterministic finite state machines and 
implemented as rule sequences. The security officer, through a graphical user in-
terface, can access relevant monitoring capabilities. In addition, the expert system 
archives data on completed and cancelled attacks involving users and creates se-
curity reports. The weakness of the system are that it is not totally distributed, as it 
still relies on a central point to make security decisions, and is passive as it only 
generates reports, and does not take immediate actions. 
 
Other approaches include: 
 
• Theoretical approach. Abdelaziz Mounji and Baudouin Le Charlier [3.19] have 
built a security model based on logic programming and formalism. Unfortunately, 
their model is too specific, and is difficult to reconfigure and upgrade. It is also 
not suitable for cross-platform implementations. 
• Hardware specific. Some other approaches are hardware specific, such as the 
Cisco intrusion detection system [3.20]. The Cisco Secure IDS includes two com-
ponents: sensor and director. Cisco Secure IDS sensors are high-speed network 
appliances, and analyse the content and context of individual data packets to de-
termine if traffic is authorised. If an intrusion is detected, such as a SATAN 
(System Administrators Tool for Analysing Networks) attack, a ping sweep, or if an 
insider sends out a document containing a proprietary code word, IDS sensors 
detect the misuse in real-time and forward alarms to an IDS director management 
console for geographical display. The offender is then removed from the network. 
The main disadvantage of the system is that it requires all the routers and network 
devices to perform to a Cisco-derived specification. 
• Conservation of flow. John R. Hughes et al. [3.21] have developed a monitor for 
routers to examine system behaviour. Specifically they use the law of Conserva-
tion of Flow which states that an input must either be absorbed, or sent on as an 
output (possibly with modification). This is an attractive tool to analyse network 
protocols for security properties, and it can detect disruptive network elements 
that launch Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, by absorbing or discarding packets. 
The system uses WATCHERS [3.58] which is a distributed network monitoring 
protocol designed to detect and isolate these malicious routers [3.59]. Its use re-
quires several assumptions about the protocols being analysed. They examine the 
WATCHERS algorithm to detect misbehaving routers. The research has shown 
that without sufficient verification of its assumptions, the Conservation of Flow 
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principle can be defeated [3.60].  
• Database security. Despite the necessity of protecting information stored in da-
tabase systems (DBS), existing security models are insufficient to prevent misuse, 
especially insider abuse by legitimate users. Liu [3.61], for example, outlines how 
the database system could isolate attacks by rewriting SQL statements. Even 
though there are available means to guard the information stored in the database 
system against misuse, they are seldom used by security officers because security 
policies of the organisation are either imprecise or not known at all. Detection of 
Misuse in Database Systems (DEMIDS) [3.23] is a security misuse system tailored 
to relational database systems and uses audit logs to derive profiles that describe 
typical behaviour, in particular, insider abuse. The system is a specialised applica-
tion to the general type of report creating systems, and generates reports 
according to a user’s database behaviour. 
 
Other IDS’s generate reports that system administrators have to search through, and 
rely on the existing system software applications to gather the intrusion data, such as 
CyberTrace [3.22]. System administrator know that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
tell what is going on the network, and can use tools such as tcpdump [3.62], and 
LANalyzer [3.63], to filter the raw data. Thus, an important objective of the research is 
to create a tool that cannot only collect network traffic, but also makes a judgement 
on possible intrusions. As CyberTrace identifies high priority connections with num-
bers (zero to 10), an administrator can review the highlights and even replay those 
sessions, and ignore connections with low priorities numbers (30 to 100).  
3.4 Internet intrusion detection systems 
The requirement for Internet Intrusion Detection systems grows as the networks, in-
cluding the Internet, grows. Many vendors claim to have the ultimate solution, such 
as Computer Associates (CA) and McAfee Security. Unfortunately, as networks grow 
in size and complexity, protecting them from threats, such as from low-level protocol 
attacks, and server and desktop intrusion, it becomes more difficult. Viruses and ma-
licious applets traversing the internal network pose other dangers. In addition, it is 
necessary to detect and block inappropriate network access to internal services and 
desktops, as well as outside URLs. 
3.4.1 eTrust Intusion Detection 
eTrust Intrusion Detection [3.24] detects patterns in network traffic that indicate po-
 Computer Network Security Systems   38 
tential intrusions. It can detect a denial-of-service attack, and take appropriate action 
based upon predefined policies before they have an impact on the network. This sys-
tem significantly reduces training levels and the time required to manage and ensure 
a safe network. The overall security policy compliance is also easier as it gives de-
tailed statistical reports on policy violations, and where they came from.  
 Distinctive Features of eTrust are: 
 
• Network access control. This uses a rules based system to define the users that 
can access specific resources on the network, ensuring only authorised access to 
network resources. 
• Advanced anti-virus engine. A virus-scanning engine detects and blocks network 
traffic containing computer viruses. It also protects users from innocuously 
downloading virus-infected files. 
• Comprehensive attack pattern library. This automatically detects attack patterns 
from network traffic.  
• Packet sniffing. This operates in stealth mode, and is undetectable to attackers.  
• URL blocking. Administrators can designate URLs that users are not allowed to 
visit. 
• Word pattern scanning. Administrators can define word patterns that may indi-
cate policy violations, as this prevents sensitive data from being sent without 
authorisation through e-mail or the Web. 
 
This intrusion detection system is build specifically for dealing with external intru-
sions, and specifically for intrusions from unknown hosts and intrusions to WWW 
and email servers. 
3.4.2 GrIDS 
GrIDS constructs graphs which represent hosts and activity in a network [3.25], such 
as the tracking of a worm. Worms are programs that propagate themselves across a 
network using resources of one machine to attack others [3.27]. For example, if a 
worm starts from host A and then initiates connections to hosts B and C and causes 
them to be infected. These two connections are reported to a GrIDS module, which 
creates a new graph representing this activity and records when it occurred. If 
enough time passes without further activity from hosts A, B, or C, the graph will be 
forgotten. However, if the worm spreads quickly to hosts D and E, then this new activ-
ity is added to the graph and the graph’s time stamp is updated. By examining the 
pattern of generated graphs, the GrIDS system can determine if an attack has been 
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made and generate a report.  
3.4.3 Bro 
Bro is a stand-alone system for detecting network intruders in real-time by passively 
monitoring a network link over which the intruder’s traffic travels over [3.26]. It has 
high-speed monitoring, real-time notification, a clear separation between mecha-
nism and policy, and can be extended. For this, Bro is divided into an event engine 
that reduces a network traffic stream into a series of higher-level events, and a policy 
script interpreter that interprets event handlers written in a specialised language used 
to express the site’s security policy. These event handlers can update state informa-
tion, synthesise new events, record information to disk, and generate real-time 
notifications through a system log. 
3.4.4 AAFID - An Architecture for Intrusion Detection using Autonomous Agents 
A recent approach to the intrusion detection problem is to use software agents, such 
as the AAFID environment [3.28]. As agents are independently running entities, they 
can be added and removed from a system without altering other components. There 
is thus no need to restart the IDS when there is a system change. The elements of the 
AAFID architecture are: 
 
• Agents, transceivers and monitors. These can be distributed over any number of 
hosts in a network. Each host may contain any number of agents that monitor 
specific events occurring in the hosts. All the agents in the host report their find-
ings to a single transceiver.  
• Transceivers. These reside on the host and oversee the operation of all the agents 
running on their host. They exert control over the agents running on that host, 
and they have the ability to start, stop and send configuration commands to the 
agents. The transceivers report their results to one or more monitors, who oversee 
a number of transceivers.  
• Monitors. These have access to network-wide data, and they thus are able to per-
form higher-level correlation and detect intrusions that involve several hosts. 
Monitors can be organised in a hierarchical manner so that a monitor may in turn 
report to another higher-level monitor. In addition, a transceiver may report to 
more than one monitor to provide redundancy and resistance to the failure of one 
of the monitors. 
 
The agent does not have the authority to directly generate an alarm, as this is the 
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function of either the transceiver or monitor. By combining reports from different 
agents, transceivers build the status of their host and monitors. This can then be used 
to determine the status of their network. The main disadvantages of this system are 
that the monitors are single points of failure, and, if multiple monitors are intro-
duced, there is a problem with the consistency and duplication of information. 
Another drawback is that the architecture does not specify access control mecha-
nisms to allow for different users to have different levels of access. 
3.4.5 NetSTAT 
A network-oriented system is NetSTAT [3.29]. Network-based intrusion detection is 
challenging as network auditing produces large amounts of data, and different events 
related to a single intrusion may be visible in different places on the network. Net-
STAT is a new approach to network intrusion detection, as it uses a formal model of 
both the network and the attacks. From this, NetSTAT is able to determine which 
network events have to be monitored and where they can be monitored. 
3.4.6 IDA 
The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) in Japan [3.41] developed a 
network intrusion detection system called Intrusion Detection Agent system (IDA). 
This employs mobile agents to avoid some of the problems experienced by conven-
tional IDSs. IDA allows mobile agents to trace intruders, collecting information only 
related to the intrusion along the intrusion-route, and deciding whether, in fact, an 
intrusion has occurred. These functions enable efficient information retrieval, and 
make it possible to detect compromised intermediate hosts. The idea behind the sys-
tem is that the agents do not always monitor the user behaviour, but they wait and 
see if the user generated some intrusion pattern. When this happens, the agent starts 
monitoring the user and tries to determine if an intrusion is in progress. The draw-
back of the system is that the system tried to have the minimum amount of overhead. 
This it will concentrate on general intrusions, and will thus must some of the less ob-
vious ones. 
3.4.7 Ludovic Me 
Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used to construct intrusion detection systems, 
such as Me, L [3.30]. This uses a security model that analyses audit log files using ge-
netic algorithms. According to him, predefined intrusion detection can be viewed as a 
pattern-matching problem (that is, finding a regular expression with a back-
referencing operator in a string). The NP-completeness of this problem makes classi-
cal algorithms quite impossible to apply to real audit logs. Thus, he decided to 
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eliminate time from the attack scenarios. This means that attacks become sets of user 
actions rather than sequences of user actions. The resulting problem remains NP-
complete, thus a heuristic had to be founded to solve the problem in a realistic execu-
tion time. His choice relies on genetic algorithms, which were initially proposed by 
John Holland in the 1970s. These are based on the mechanism of natural selection in 
a population of individuals. Each individual is evaluated through a mathematical 
function, which models that problem. The population is randomly generated and 
then evolves, and the best-evaluated individuals being favoured. Genetic algorithms 
allow for a quasi-optimal solution to a given problem by evaluating only a very small 
proportion of the completely possible solutions. The time that taken to extract the 
attack information of the audit log file is not affected by the size of the file, but only by 
the number of attacks. This approach to the intrusion detection problem just con-
firms the attack, but does nothing to prevent it. Genetic algorithms, though, could be 
useful in detecting attacks which do not follow a logical flow, and do not fit into the 
normal rules of attack.  
3.4.8 Reactive Intrusion Detection (RID) 
An active firewall is one method of securing a network against external intruders, 
where the firewall is able to collect attack data and reconfigure itself for future at-
tacks. One example is RID from Gauntlet Firewalls [3.31]. The LURHQ Corporation 
have also developed a firewall-integrated anomaly, host and network based intrusion 
detection product. This intrusion detection tool designed to unobtrusively monitor, 
detect, and respond to suspicious activity in real-time. By integrating into the Gaunt-
let firewall, RID eliminates the need for a piecemeal approach to network security.  
 RID can be used in conjunction with one or more firewalls throughout a network 
and has comprehensive configuration capabilities. It uses an up-to-date attack signa-
ture database which identifies all known attacks, as well as the ability to identify 
abusive behaviour. RID can be customised with different reaction profiles for every 
type of attack or host. Unfortunately the system is mainly aimed at detecting external 
intruders. 
3.4.9 Snort 
Snort is a libpcap-based [3.32] packet sniffer and logger that can be used as a light-
weight network intrusion detection system (NIDS). It has rules-based logging for 
content pattern matching, and detects a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer 
overflows [3.33], stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, and much more. Snort 
also has real-time alerting capability, with alerts being sent to syslog, Server Message 
Block (SMB) WinPopup messages, or a separate alert file.  
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 Snort fills an important ecological niche in the realm of network security [3.38]. Its 
main features are: 
 
• It is a cross-platform, lightweight network intrusion detection tool that can be 
used to monitor small TCP/IP networks and detect a wide variety of suspicious 
network traffic, as well as outright attacks.  A lightweight intrusion detection sys-
tem can be easily used on most nodes on a network, with a minimal disruption to 
operations. Lightweight IDS’s should be cross-platform, have a small system foot-
print, and be easily configured by system administrators who need to implement 
a specific security solution in a short amount of time. They can be any set of soft-
ware tools, which can be assembled and put into action in response to evolving 
security situations. Lightweight IDS’ are small, powerful, and flexible enough to 
be used as permanent elements of the network security infrastructure.  
• It provides administrators with enough data to make informed decisions on the 
proper course of action in the face of suspicious activity.  
• It can be used to quickly fill potential holes in a network’s security coverage, such 
as when a new attack emerges and commercial security vendors are slow to re-
lease new attack recognition signatures.  
 
Snort is configured using command line, which switches optional Berkeley Packet 
Filter [3.34] commands. The detection engine is programmed using a simple lan-
guage that describes per packet tests and actions. Ease-of-use simplifies and 
expedites the development of new exploit detection rules. For example, when the IIS 
Showcode WWW exploits  [3.35] were revealed on the Bugtraq mailing list [3.36], 
Snort rules detected the probes and signatures were available within a few hours. 
Snort shares commonalties with both sniffers and NIDS, and its main objective is to 
stop attack from outside the network, but not from the inside. 
 Snort has also been highlighted as suffering from too many alarms [3.66] and not 
being able to detect new types of attack [3.67], but some of these problems are now 
being overcome with AI techniques. Snort is now becoming popular in monitoring 
network traffic, and can even be implemented in hardware for gigabit Ethernet bit 
streams [3.68]. 
3.5 Visualisation of IDS’s 
Mathematical models are used to visualise intrusion, as visually presented informa-
tion can encode large amounts of complex, interrelated data, that can be easily view 
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by human operators [3.39]. The limitations of traditional IDS techniques are as much 
a function of the ability of a human to process large amounts of information as they 
are limitations of the techniques themselves.  
 A spicule is a spheroid geometric primitive, which is used as the basis for the visu-
alisation model. One spicule represents the system model for one host on a network. 
The spicule’s volume gives a measure of the security fitness of the host, where secu-
rity fitness is a weighted sum of factors that add or detract from the vulnerability of 
the host. Computer systems with high security fitness will have smaller spicules than 
those of higher risk. Since the security fitness can be represented in this spherical 
fashion, it enables the usage of volumes and radii of a spicule as a mathematical 
property. Spicules also model other features of system activity, viewing them in terms 
of vectors. The values of some of these features, called tracking vectors can be nor-
malized between 0 and 100%. An example of a tracking vector is CPU utilisation, 
which cannot exceed 100%. As a featured value grows, its associated tracking vector 
travels along a path on the surface of the spicule towards the vertical axis. Vectors, 
which cannot be normalised in this way, are called fixed vectors. These vectors are 
located at the equator of the spicule and can grow in magnitude coplanar to the hori-
zontal axis. An example of a fixed vector is the number of child processes forked by a 
particular user. A signature can be obtained from both tracking and fixed vectors by 
tracing the path from a starting state to an end state. This signature can, in turn, be 
used as a mathematical property. The model is a mathematical characterisation of 
the types of attacks that can occur to a specific system. 
3.6 Using the system administrator 
Some intrusion detection systems rely on the system administrator in order to work 
correctly. En Garde Systems, Inc. T-sight [3.40] is a good example, as it is based on the 
principle of manual intrusion detection. Their IDS is highly configurable and the sys-
tem administrators must know the system well so they can transport their knowledge 
of the system to the IDS. En Garde Systems believes manual intrusion detection is es-
sential to comprehensive security, and knowledge and techniques in this field create 
the backbone of T-sight. It is felt that automated intrusion detection, which relies on 
flags generated by a static list of signature attacks, can give administrators a false 
sense of security. Although automated features are useful, they cannot keep up with 
the fact that security threats are constantly changing and may differ from company to 
company. Even if an organisation has firewall, it may not be completely safe, as a 
firewall cannot help with internal attacks. Consequently, a manual intrusion detec-
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tion system is preferred as it is totally customisable. T-sight has a user-friendly, out-
of-the-box interface that allows the administrator to adapt many functions to their 
needs, particularly on how data is viewed and what types of data are viewed. Since an 
administrator understands their network better than anyone does, it makes sense to 
allow them to be able to adjust the functionality of the tool so that it will be used on 
that network. This intrusion detection system is thus enhancing the monitoring utili-
ties of the operating system and does not provide any prevention from the attacks. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have discussed different techniques of software agent environ-
ments, and have analysed the different categories of software agents. We also have 
analysed different implementation of software agents, to enhance computer security. 
One major conclusion is that there is no definitive method which can be used to 
completely protect a network against intrusion. 
 In most cases, the implementation of the techniques has been achieved by install-
ing security enhancement software on a centralized server. When this software 
crashes, or is breached, the complete network is at risk. To overcome this, a highly 
distributed system, such as using agents, can be used as these disperse network secu-
rity management around the network. To address this, this research has built a 
security enhancement environment in which security management is dispersed 
across the network using software agents. In addition, even if the intrusion detection 
system is real-time, it can detect the intrusion after the action, but never before. We 
use a hybrid method, and thus get the best qualities of rules based systems and the 
statistical anomaly methods. In addition, to address the problem of detecting intru-
sions after they take place, we use a new statistical model based on Bayesian 
multivariate regression proposed by Pikoulas and Triantafyllopoulos [3.12], which 
takes into account user behaviour and generates a predicted profile, so that the intru-
sion system has sufficient information to foresee the future user actions. 
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4  Prediction Techniques  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the basic principles involved in the prediction model used in 
the research. It also introduces different prediction techniques, especially on statisti-
cal forecasting, and the differing techniques used in statistical forecasting using 
Bayesian statistics.  Security systems of the future must take into account prediction, 
as new security breaches can result from unknown methods of attack. A good exam-
ple of this is with the Love Bug virus, which spread from country to country as fast as 
the sun rose across world. Few systems detected it, as these systems did not have 
strong prediction techniques.  
 Whenever a new type of attack occurs the security systems can be quickly updated 
with new rules, and updated software patches, but, in many cases, these can occur 
too late to avoid some loss of service, or data. It can also be embarrassing for organi-
zations if they have been seen as the focus of a security breach. Thus, it is important 
that prediction techniques are used on security systems. These can never run without 
producing false-positives, but their sensitivity can be fine-tuned by the system ad-
ministrator. If too many false-positives are produced, they can swamp true-positives, 
thus good forecasting can aid the process of fine-tuning the intrusion detection proc-
ess. 
 In statistics, we have two major forecasting techniques that are used: ARIMA mod-
els, and their variants, and Bayesian models. ARIMA models were first proposed by 
Box and Jenkins [4.4], and are widely used for short- and long-term prediction, espe-
cially in financial markets. They are complex models in that they have many variants, 
which must be set correctly before they give some accurate results. Bayesian models 
are first proposed by Rev. Thomas Bayes in 1763 [4.2], and they are now gaining grow-
ing support in the statistical community, as they are easier to configure and they give 
better results for short-term prediction. Both models are used in linear forecasting 
problems.  
 Bayesian methods were popular until the 1930s when they were seen as subjective 
and thus unscientific (as science often defines that experiments are conducted in an 
objective way). It fell out of favour for a while, but it now back in favour, and new ap-
plications of it include in medicine, such as in the investigation of the claims of a clot-
reducing drug, and in the legal profession, in analysing the probability of the occur-
rence of DNA evidence in jury trails.  
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4.2 Forecasting methods 
This section gives an brief introduction to forecasting and forecasting methods. The 
most widely used forecasting methods, especially for short analysis forecasting [4.1], 
are: 
 
• Multiple regression analysis. This is used when two or more independent factors 
are involved and is widely used for intermediate-term forecasting. It is used to as-
sess which factors to include and which to exclude, and can be used to develop 
alternate models with different factors. For example, in a security system, impor-
tant factors are likely to be the applications and resources that a user uses, and 
how they typically operate a computer, rather than the sizes of the files that a user 
creates. It has been applied in many areas of forecasting weather patterns, such as 
with Kung et al. [4.9] who used it to predict the Indian monsoon. It has also been 
applied to others areas of science and technology, such as Yamada [4.6] who used 
it to estimating the peak loading of water demand and electrical power, whereas 
Gardener [4.7] has applied it to the forecasting of blood supplies.  
• Non-linear regression. This method does not assume a linear relationship be-
tween variables and is frequently used when time is the independent variable. 
Renxiang et al. [4.8] has applied it to forecasting passengers on transport systems. 
They select dependent variables using statistical factors, rather than using subject 
judgements, and conclude that non-linear regression methods, in this applica-
tion, are more effective than linear regression models. 
• Trend Analysis. This method uses linear and non-linear regression with time as 
the explanatory variable used where the pattern varies over time. Menge [4.10] 
used trend analysis to predict short-range demand for electricity. The need for ac-
curacy in forecasting demand in electrical supply, as providers must be able to 
foresee demand before they occur. 
• Decomposition analysis. This is used to identify several patterns that appear si-
multaneously in a time series. It is time-consuming each time it is used, and is 
typically used to de-seasonalise a series. Huth [4.10] compared decomposition 
analysis to changes of temperature in Central Europe to other methods, such as 
multiple-linear regression methods, and concluded that it was a reasonable 
method for predicting long-term patterns. 
• Moving average analysis. This is based on moving averages, which forecasts are 
based on a weighted average of past values. It has the advantage of being simple 
to implement. Smunt [4.11] applied moving average analysis to project planning, 
 Prediction Techniques   51 
and concluded that it can give better estimates for short-term costs than learning-
curve models, and standard analysis methods. 
• Weighted moving averages. This is a powerful and economical method, and uses 
methods like sum-of-the-digits and trend adjustment methods. It is widely used 
where repeated forecasts required. Many researchers have applied it to there 
work, especially in time series applications [4.13-4.15], and in networking algo-
rithms, such as with Edge [4.16] who applied it to a timeout algorithm in packet 
switched networks. 
• Adaptive filtering. This is another type of moving average, and includes a method 
of learning from past errors. It is typically used to respond to changes in the rela-
tive importance of trend, seasonal, and random factors [4.17, 4.18] 
• Exponential smoothing. This is a moving average form of time-series forecasting. 
It is efficient with seasonal patterns, and easy to adjust for past errors. It is also 
easy to prepare follow-on forecasts, and where several different forms are used 
depending on presence of trend or cyclical variations. Synder [4.19] and Gardner 
[4.20] applied it to the seasonal forecasting of inventories, and Fei et al. [4.21] ap-
plied it to traffic forecasting. In networking, Brutlag [4.22] used exponential 
smoothing to predict aberrant behaviour over time. They proposed a model 
which allowed simultaneous, real-time monitoring of users over the network. The 
model proved to be fast and effective, but suffered from not being optimal. 
• Hodrick-Prescott filter. This is a smoothing mechanism which is used to obtain 
long-term trends in a time series. It decomposes a given series into stationary and 
non-stationary components so that their sum of squares of the series from the 
non-stationary component is a minimum, with a penalty on changes to the de-
rivatives of this component. It has been applied to several economic applications 
[4.23]. 
4.2.1 Forecasting by a regression analysis 
Regression is the study of relationships among variables. Its main purpose is to pre-
dict, or estimate, the value of one variable from known or assumed values of other 
variables which relate to it. It includes: 
 
• Variables of interest. To make predictions or estimates we must identify the effec-
tive predictors of the variable of interest. These are variables which are important 
indicators and can be measured at the least cost, which only carry a small amount 
of information, and are thus redundant. 
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• Predicting the future. Predicting a change over time or extrapolating from present 
conditions to future conditions is not the function of regression analysis. For this, 
time series analysis typically used. 
• Experiment. This begins with a hypothesis about how several variables might be 
related and the form of their relationship. 
 
Types of analysis include: 
 
• Simple linear regression. This is regression using only one predictor and is called 
a simple regression. 
• Multiple regression. This is where there are two or more predictors are used and  
multiple regression analysis must be used. Complex systems such as weather 
forecasting, which depends on variables such as temperatures, pressures, air 
movements, sea changes, and so on, use multiple regression methods. 
 
The following are general steps on how to design, construct, feed data and get the re-
sults of a regression model [4.1]: 
 
• Data. Since it is normally unrealistic to obtain information on an entire popula-
tion, a sample is taken, which is a subset of the population. The sample may be 
either randomly selected or the x-values (the independent variable) are based on 
the capability of the equipment to be utilised in the experiment. Where the x-
values are preselected, usually only limited inferences can be drawn depending 
upon the particular values chosen. When both x and y are randomly drawn, infer-
ences can generally be drawn over the range of values in the sample. 
• Scatter diagram. This is a graphical representation of the pairs of data, and can be 
drawn to gain an overall view of the problem. This makes it easier to determine an 
apparent relationship. If the points lie within a band described by parallel lines, 
then there is a linear relationship between the pair of x and y values. If the rate of 
change is generally not constant, then the relationship is curvilinear. 
• The model. If we have determined there is a linear relationship between t and y 
we require a linear equation stating that y as a function of x in the form Y = a + bt + 
e, where a is the intercept, b is the slope. The error term (e) is the error term ac-
counting for variables that affect y, but are not included as predictors, and/or 
otherwise unpredictable and uncontrollable factors. 
• Least squares method. To predict the mean y-value for a given t-value, we need a 
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line which passes through the mean value of both t and y and which minimises 
the sum of the distance between each of the points and the predictive line. Such 
an approach should result in a line, which is often called the best fit to the sample 
data. The least squares method achieves this result by calculating the minimum 
average squared deviations between the sample y points and the estimated line. A 
procedure is used for finding the values of a and b which reduces to the solution 
of simultaneous linear equations. Shortcut formulas have been developed as an 
alternative to the solution of simultaneous equations. 
• Solution methods. Techniques of matrix algebra can be manually employed to 
solve simultaneous linear equations. When performing manual computations, 
this technique is especially useful when there are more than two equations in two 
unknowns. Several well-known computer packages are widely available and can 
be utilised to relieve the user of the computational problem, all of which can be 
used to solve both linear and polynomial equations: the BMD (Biomedical Com-
puter Programs) [4.24] from UCLA; SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) [4.25] developed by the University of Chicago; and SAS (Statistical 
Analysis System) [4.26].  
• Use and interpretation of the regression equation. The equation developed can 
be used to predict an average value over the range of the sample data. The fore-
cast is good for short to medium ranges. 
• Measuring error in estimations. The scatter or variability around the mean value 
can be measured by calculating the variance, which is the average squared devia-
tion of the values around the mean. The standard error of estimate is derived from 
this value by taking the square root. This value is interpreted as the average 
amount that actual values differ from the estimated mean. 
• Confidence intervals. Interval estimates can be calculated to obtain a measure of 
the confidence that a relationship exists. These calculations are made using t-
distribution tables. From these calculations, it is possible to derive confidence 
bands, a pair of non-parallel lines, of which the narrowest at the mean values ex-
press the confidence in varying degrees of the band of values surrounding the 
regression equation. 
• Assessment. This determines how confidant that a relationship actually exist. The 
strength of this relationship can be assessed by statistical tests of that hypothesis 
such as the null hypothesis, which are established using t-distribution, R-squared, 
and F-distribution tables. These calculations generate a standard error of the re-
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gression coefficient, an estimate of the amount that the regression coefficient b 
will vary from sample to sample of the same size for the same population. An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) table can be generated which summarises the dif-
ferent components of variation. When comparing models of differing size 
(different numbers of independent variables and/or different sample sizes), it 
must use the Adjusted R-Squared, because the usual R-Squared tends to grow 
with the number of independent variables. The standard error of estimate (that is, 
square root of error mean square) is a good indicator of the quality of a prediction 
model as it adjusts the error sum of squares (EMS) for the number of predictors in 
the model as follow: 
 
  
predictorst independen linearly ofNumber 
squares of sumError 
−= NEMS   (4.1) 
 
If one keeps adding useless predictors to a model, the EMS becomes less stable. R-
squared is also influenced by the range of your dependent value so if two models 
have the same residual mean square, but one model has a much narrower range of 
values for the dependent variable, that model will have a higher R-squared. This 
explains the fact that both models will do as well for prediction purposes. A con-
siderable portion of the output of the computer programs previously mentioned 
are devoted to a description of the tests of significance of the regression. 
 
The following sections, discuss Bayesian statistics and Bayesian models.  
4.3 Bayesian statistics 
Rev. Thomas Bayes [4.2], an English clergyman, first proposed that data could be 
converted into probabilities. He thus established a mathematical basis for probability 
inference (a means of calculating, from the number of times an event has not oc-
curred, the probability that it will occur in future trials). He set down his findings on 
probability in the Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances (1763) 
[4.27], which was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London.  
 Bayes competes against frequentism methods, which determine the probabilities 
of the frequency of an event over a long period. It would thus judge that a coin would 
have a 50% chance of landing heads, and a 50% chance of landing tails. For this we 
must this take a large enough population, and draw definite theories on the probabil-
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ity of an event. Short-term and medium-term results do not necessarily go as the 
probability defines. For example, in the short-term it is unlikely that we would get the 
same number of heads as tails for a coin flip. Thus, how do we determine that a coin 
is operating as it should? For example if we tip as coin 100 times, and determine that 
it lands on head for 60 times, and tails for 40 times. In Bayesian, we can actually de-
termine the chances of getting heads based on the evidence of the past, and can thus 
take into account any possibilities that a coin has been tampered with. 
 Key terms which are important in analysing Bayes theorem are: 
 
• Prior probability. This is the probability of a theory being correct, prior to taking 
into account new evidence.  For example, if the chances of a student successfully 
completing a course of PhD studies is 30%, then before a students starts their 
studies the chance of them successfully completing their studies is 3 in 10. 
• Posterior probability. This is the updated probabilities of a theory being true, af-
ter new data has been taken account of. For example, with PhD studies, a new 
survey could take place, which gave up-to-date statistics for the completions 
rates. This might change the probability of successful completions. 
• Likelihood ratio. This is a measure of how strong the evidence is. The more prob-
able it is, the higher the factor will be. This is obviously important in areas such as 
in DNA legal evidence, where an expert witness must define the chance that DNA 
evidence could be from another person. Bayesian methods have been applied to 
this area, and can produce likelihoods ratios of one in 100,000, or more. 
 
Bayesian methods are now becoming popular over frequentism methods, as they can 
cope with large amounts of data, from which it is possible to draw strong conclusions, 
that define how well defined the conclusion is. Medical studies have applied this to 
disprove claims that a clot-reducing drug reduced heart attacks by 50%. It is also ap-
plied to areas such as defining the chances of weather predictions being true. It thus 
focuses on converting data into probabilities. In network security, it would determine 
the probability that users would operate in a certain way, based on the history, and 
not on some defined profile, that models the user.  Many, at the time it was defined, 
and in future years, disapproved of the method. It general it basically defines the: 
 
• Likelihood. It measures the strength of evidence and compares the relative likeli-
hood of getting such evident if the theory was true, and if it is false. The larger the 
likelihood ratio, the better for making conclusions. 
• Prior probability. This defines that the probability of the theorem for the data is 
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true, before collecting the data. This goes against our basic theory of life where 
things must be seen as false, before we get evidence to show that it is true. Imag-
ine if a jury in a trail were to assume that a person was guilty before they were 
tried, and the defence would have to produce evidence to show that their client 
has not guilty. Also in the case of a person flipping a coin, the question we might 
initially ask is ‘Has the coin be tampered with?’. Thus, we would assume, initially 
that the coin had been tampered with, and then the evidence of coin flips would 
show us if the coin had really been tampered with. Each new flip would vary our 
likelihood factor, so eventually we could say that there is a 1 in 100,000 chance 
that the coin had been tampered with. This gives humans an opportunity to un-
derstand the odds of an event, and make decisions. 
 
In security, it could be defined that prior probability is that all users want to do dam-
age against a system, and user behaviour data must be used to overcome this theory. 
This is actually a good viewpoint in a highly secure environment. Bayesian also has 
the advantage that it will base it judgements on posterior data, and not on a standard 
model of the user. In most cases, in a frequentism method, the user would be viewed 
as a non-intruder, and not of an intruder. Bayesian takes an opposite viewpoint, and 
will initially define that the theorem is initially true (a probability of 1), or false (a 
probability of 0). Bayes initially produced this theorem, but at the time could not pro-
duce the mathematics to solve it. Laplace (1771) eventually used Bayes’ ideas, and 
used it to investigate the claim that there were more boys born in Paris, rather than 
girls. 
 A problem with Bayesian is obviously the initial viewpoint. With a new drug, the 
manufacturing company could define that the initial viewpoint is that it will be suc-
cessful, whereas scientists investigating its success will define the opposite viewpoint. 
The same can be said for network security. From a users point-of-view the initial 
viewpoint would be that all users were non-intruders and that intruders would then 
be identified, while a network manager might have the opposite point-of-view, where 
all users are potential intruders, and they must show by their behaviour that they are 
not intruders.  In the 1920s, researchers tried to overcome this problem by developing 
objective ways to test theories, which did not have a prior probability. These were not 
successful, and frequentism methods become popular, as Bayesian methods were 
seen as unscientific and subjective. The frequentism methods then become standard 
techniques, where p-values were used to check the statistical significance. Often a p-
value of between than 1 and 20 identified that the result had a significant conclusion. 
Unfortunately, many have argued that this p-value does not actually improve the 
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weighting of the conclusions over the Bayesian approach. Luckily, the 1980s saw an 
increase in computing power, which allowed Bayesian methods to be properly im-
plemented in an efficient way. There was also a large increase in the amount of data 
generated, which, as Bayesian makes improved decisions the more data that it has, 
has made Bayesian an effective way to make decisions on. The applicability of Bayes-
ian was initially highlighted by research, in the 1990s, into the benefits of a clot 
reducing drug. The drug company initially quoted that it had, using frequentism 
methods, a success rate of 50%. Several researchers, including Spiegelhalter at the 
London School of Hygiene, showed that, using Bayesian methods, the actually rate 
was less than this. No one could initially tell if these results were correct, but now af-
ter a decade after the research, it has been shown that the success rate was about a 
half the value quoted. Thus, Bayesian has better predicted this result. The Bayesian 
approach of viewing the drug as not being successful is a good one, as the drug must 
prove itself before it can be validated. 
 In DNA evidence, Bayesian has also changed the way that the legal professional 
looks at DNA evidence. Before the Bayesian method was applied to this evidence, ex-
pert witnesses regularly told that there were certain odds, such as 1 in 100 000, that 
DNA matches in the population. This is the probability of a person having the same 
DNA as another person. Bayesian argues that this is not true, and that all the evidence 
involved in the case should be taken into account. Frequencism methods would take 
the complete population, and determine the probability of these occurrences. Bayes-
ian would argue that we should start with the assumption that it will match, and then 
gather data from around the evidence. This may show that there are localised 
changes which increases or decreases the probability of a conclusion. Thus, in net-
work security, we can take into account localised factors. In fact, it can take into 
account individual users, rather than averaging users over a complete population. 
 Bayes and empirical Bayes (EB) [4.3] methods combine information from similar 
components of information and produce efficient inferences for both individual 
components and for shared model characteristics. Many complex problems are ideal 
settings for this type of synthesis. For example, county-specific disease incidence 
rates can be unstable due to small populations or low rates. Borrowing information 
from adjacent counties by partial pooling produces better estimates for each county, 
and Bayes/empirical Bayes methods structure the approach. Importantly, recent ad-
vances in computing and the consequential ability to evaluate complex models have 
increased the popularity and applicability of Bayesian methods. Bayes and EB meth-
ods can be implemented using modern Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
computational methods. Properly structured Bayes and EB procedures typically have 
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good frequentist and Bayesian performance, both in theory and in practice. This, in 
turn, motivates their use in advanced high-dimensional model settings (for example 
in longitudinal data or spatio-temporal mapping models), where a Bayesian model 
implemented with MCMC often provides the only feasible approach that incorpo-
rates all relevant model features. 
4.3.1 Prediction in Detail 
A time series is a collection of data throughout time, and are called observations. 
Normally they are collected at certain time intervals, such as every second, every 
minute, every day, every month, or every year. At each time t, we may have either one 
observation (univariate time series) or several observations (multivariate time series). 
This depends on what we want to model and predict. For example, if we want to pro-
duce predictions for an index, such as a financial index or the sales of a company, we 
can use univariate time series. However, if we want to predict intruder behaviour 
within a complete network we need to consider multivariate time series. The depend-
ence structure is of particular interest, such as are the intruders act independently, 
and if they do not, can we derive information about one intruders’s action from an-
other? These questions will be answered in the following chapters.  
 Time series models have been used successively from the 1950s and on in a wide 
variety of real-life problems, especially with Box and Jenkins [4.4] and Kalman [4.5]. 
Both these researchers dominated the time series world, mainly because: 
 
• The Box and Jenkins approach has an integrated implementation as well as the 
design part, in the 1980s. They have applied this to several areas, such as in the 
forecasting the demand for blood [4.7].  
• The Kalman filtering approach has a unique representation power through the 
state-space models that makes it relatively easy to deal with, and thus reduces a 
complicated modelling to s relatively simple one.  
 
Box and Jenkins models are usually referred to as ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated 
Moving Average) models. In practice, these are based on the assumption that the se-
ries of interest is stationary, or it can be reduced to a stationary one using a 
transformation series. By stationary, it is defined that the mean and the variance of 
the series is constant over time and correlation over the series does not depend on 
time. This shows that the level of the series is constant throughout time, and that the 
variation of the series is always constant or approximately constant. These models 
require certain distributional assumptions that we avoid discussing here. The impor-
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tant thing to note is that an implicit assumption is that all the future forecasts depend 
on some kind of averages of the past observations. In certain cases, this is a valid as-
sumption, however not always. Unfortunately, there is rarely justification for these 
assumptions. The ARIMA modeller is thus hoping that the forecasts will follow this 
simple rule and the only judgement on this is by comparing the predictions with the 
real data. However, care must be drawn here, especially for systems that change rap-
idly.  
 Let tY  represent a single variable of interest that may be called the response at time 
t. The index t is a subset of the integer numbers values: 1, 2, 3,…, T. Then the simplest 
ARIMA model, abbreviated as AR(1), is defined by: 
 
 ],,0[~,1 VNaYY tttt εε+= −             (4.2) 
 
where: 
 
a   is a constant  
tε   has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance V. The normal distribution 
means that tε  will be approximately zero and the uncertainty about this will be 
measured with the variance V.  
V  is an indicator of how far from 0, tε  is located. This, in practice, means that tY  
will be close to 1−taY .  
 
Now suppose that at time t we know the values of 1, −tYa  and that we want to predict 
the value of tY . ARIMA forecasting suggests that tY  is predicted by 1−taY . Since 1, −tYa  
are known we can perform this prediction and go on to the next time t. When tY  be-
comes available we can predict the value of 1+tY . Using the ARIMA methodology, a  
(the parameter of the model) will be estimated by the past data at time t, namely 
121 ,...,, −tYYY . 
 This simple model reflects the underlined ARIMA methodology. The response  tY  
will be a sum of previous values multiplied by constants and a sum of some other 
variables (called the moving average noises) multiplied by constants. If the initial se-
ries is not stationary, it must be reduced to a stationary one and then the 
methodology can by applied. This method is called as differentiation and it simply 
suggests instead of working with tY , considering the differentiated series 1−−= ttt YYZ . 
So, in this case, for all the past data we calculate tZ ’s, hoping that they are stationary. 
If they are not stationary we have to take higher-order differences, such as 
2−−= ttt YYZ . In addition, we go on like this until we get a stationary differenced series. 
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Box and Jenkins claim that any non-stationary time series can be reduced to a sta-
tionary one using the above methodology, but this is driven only from certain 
examples and there is no formal justification. When abrupt changes occur, the meth-
odology gives poor results. Merely, a bad observation known as outlier, can dominate 
the forecasting method yielding very poor results. One possible action for improve-
ment would be to consider time-varying coefficients ta  replacing the a ’s. However, 
ARIMA modelling is not able to handle such an approach. There is also another major 
difficulty that discourages the use of the Box and Jenkins approach. This is when mul-
tivariate modelling requires differencing that is restricted. 
 For example, consider a vector series  tY  that comprises of several scalar variables. 
Then by using 1−−= ttt YYZ  some of the scalar series (elements of tY ) may be 
stationary, although some other non-stationary. If higher differences are applied the 
elements of tY  that became stationary with 1−−= ttt YYZ , it is very possible to become 
non-stationary. It is thus if all the different elements of tY  then the independent 
ARIMA modelling can be applied, but in doing so there is no gain using multivariate 
modelling. The modeller can thus consider several univariate models. In practice, 
such independent assumptions will never be justified and usually will be unrealistic. 
For these reasons, ARIMA modelling is very restricting and problem specific. 
The Kalman filtering approach of time series modelling is based on the state 
space representation of a time series. This states that the formulation of the model is 
not explicitly given for all t, but only relevant to the previous time t–1. tY , either uni-
variate or multivariate, is related through a number of known values (not necessarily 
constant over time) with several states. These states are random variables that are re-
sponsible for prediction and that are allowed to have an evolution throughout time. 
The relationship between the states and the response is fundamental and it is as-
sumed linear. The reason for this assumption is that our system is not likely to have a 
chaotic behaviour and also that linear forms allow for full analytical results giving fast 
algorithms and saving significant memory. The state space form of a time series rep-
resentation is independent of the Kalman filtering methodology and was discovered 
before the method. In fact, we use the state space form, and avoid the Kalman ap-
proach. The reasons for this will become evident when considering the model. The 
important thing to note is that the Kalman approach is again restricted on assuming 
some of the parameters of the model known. This is a common problem with ARIMA 
modelling and there is not justification on how the modeller chooses the variance be-
tween the variables. This is a well-known problem for our models and it will be 
considered in some detail in later chapters. It is important because it is closely related 
with independence among the variables, such as independence among the users 
 Prediction Techniques   61 
and/or among the applications they use. 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter gives a general introduction on forecasting methods, and has analysed 
different forecasting methods, and the areas that each methods that each of the 
methods are used in.  We also have made a general introduction to the prediction in 
general, and how it works. The focus of the chapter has been on an introduction on 
Bayesian methods, and ARIMA models, which are the most wide use forecasting 
models from forecasting practitioners. The general assumption in Bayesian applied 
to network security is that we can define that users can be viewed, initially, either as 
non-intruders, or as intruders. It is then up to the sampled data to show otherwise. It 
is likely in a highly secure network, that all users would initially be viewed as an in-
truder. 
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5 Simple Tutorial on the Proposed     
Bayesian Method 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter justified the requirements for the Bayesian method, that is, that 
it is useful in initially defining a hypothesis, which is either true or false. This goes 
against frequencism methods which takes a long-term view on prediction. This 
method may have advantages in predicting intrusions, as it can quickly adapt to indi-
viduals user activities. In Chapter 4, it was argued that users who change their 
behaviour can be a suspect for network intrusion, in a highly secure environment.  
Thus, we can use Bayesian methods to make a prediction on future events that a user 
may access a certain resource. In this research, the resource is taken to be application 
usage, but could equally relate to the usage of any network-based resource, such as a 
file, a folder, a printer, and so on.  
5.2 Simple introduction 
The system is continuously monitoring the usage of system resources. We first made 
make some decisions on how we are going to measure our system resources usage, 
how are we going to express the result, and over what period. In this research, the 
time period is taken as one hour. Next, we decided to express this with a real value 
number and not an integer. This is because we wanted to keep the values small, so 
the initial experimentation will be smoother.  We also decided that we are going to 
grade the ‘no usage’ measurement of measuring our system resources, with ‘zero’ 
and one full hour of ‘usage’ with the ‘one’. For example if we have a measurement of 
‘0.3’ then the particular monitored system resource is used for 0.3×60min, which is 
18minutes.  
 Our prediction model is doing one-step forecasting. This means that each time 
that we want to make a forecast we can only do one hour ahead. When we will get the 
results from the forecasting of this hour, we can then forecast for the next hour, or the 
chosen time interval.  
 So let us assume that we have 20 observations and we want to make a forecast for 
the last five of them, as in Table 5.1. We take the 15th observation on our forecasting 
model, and then estimated a value for the 16th. We then compare it with the real ob-
servation that we get at the end of the hour (time interval), and put the 16th 
 Simple Tutorial on the Proposed Bayesian Method   66 
observation as a feed in our forecasting model in order to get the next one, and so on. 
As our model uses vectors, we can put an array of different observations together in 
our forecasting model and get the results. This speeds up our forecasting procedure. 
This is the case in real situations, when you we have to monitor 20 or 30 different sys-
tem resources, and get prediction results. 
 Therefore, when we apply our first observation to our model, we are getting some-
thing like what it is described in Figure 5.1. In this, we have our initial observations 
and some initial vectors that we need for our calculations. The initial values in these 
vectors are generated empirically, so they will be suited to the model. As our experi-
mentation proceeds, we adopt these values. We have to note that there has to be 
more research on our initial values and they way that they are chosen. After we feed 
the initial values into the model, we calculate the results for time T+1 if we consider 
that we are at time T. Also we feed the results back to our model for further forecast-
ing values. When the forecasting is complete, we have a vector with all the predicted 
values for each period. 
5.3 Example 
Table 5.1 shows 20 observations, which contains values between zero and one. These 
describe the usage of a specific computer application in an hour. Thus, if the ob-
served value is unity, the application is being used for one hour, and if the observed 
value is zero, it has not been used at any time within the hour. If the application de-
fined as 0.2, it has been used for 12 minutes (0.2×60). 
 In this case, for simplicity, there is only one application being monitored (repre-
sented with the letter r) and we also have only one user (represented with the letter 
n). Thus, there is one user and a number of r = 1 applications of interest. We also get 
the results of the real observations every hour. 
 As presented in Chapter 6 there are two basic equations that describe the statisti-
cal model: 
 
 ,tt
T
tt vFY += θ  ],,0[~ σNvt  (5.1) 
 ,1 ttt ωθθ += −  ],,0[~ tt WN σω  (5.2) 
 
where: 
 
tY   is a variable that we observe at time t. 
tF   an n-dimensional vector (known as the design vector). 
tθ   an n-dimensional parameter vector. 
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tv   a random variable that has a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
σ . 
tω   is an n-dimensional random vector with a multivariate normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance matrix tWσ .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Bayes Model behaviour 
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Table 5.1:  Real and predicted values 
 
 
Equation (5.1) is called the observation equation as it shows how the observations 
( tY ) are linked with the parameters ( tθ ). Here the relationship is linear which is 
shown clearly if we write the vectors ),,,( 21 nttt
T
t fffF K=  and ),,,( 21 ntttTt θθθθ K=  
(the symbol ‘T’ as a postscript refers to the transpose of a vector which is the ar-
rangement as a row) and then apply the vector multiplication: tTtF θ . Doing this, 
equation (5.1) can be written as: 
 
 tntntttttt vfffY ++++= θθθ L2211  (5.3) 
 
where tv  has the same distribution as in (5.1).  
       Equation (5.3) is a linear equation which is why the model is called a linear model. 
Normally the values nttt fff ,,21 K  will be constants not depending on t, such as 
nfff ,,, 21 K . These values are assumed to be known and, in later chapters, we discuss 
their choice. Note that these design values (building the design vector) are the 
equivalent to the design matrix in regression [5.1]. To make the above more clear, 
suppose that we choose n=2. This means that we choose to have two parameters to 
model our series tY , namely tt 21 ,θθ . The observation equation will be: 
 
 tttt vffY ++= 2211 θθ  (5.4)
 
Observation Number Real value Predicted Value 
  1 0.0  
  2 0.6  
  3 0.4  
  4 0.0  
  5 0.9  
  6 0.8  
  7 0.5  
  8 0.1  
  9 0.0  
10 0.0  
11 0.3  
12 0.3  
13 0.1  
14 0.1  
15 0.0  
16 0.6 0.0 
17 0.0 0.0 
18 0.9 0.11 
19 0.7 0.16 
20 0.7 0.14 
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The choice of n is left to the modeller. It does not have a practical interpretation, but 
it is proposed that we keep the number of parameters low, as the model uncertainty 
will increase with an increased number of parameters. This means that we will need 
more data to estimate the extra parameters, and so the system will not have fast re-
sponse due to over-parameterisation. On the other hand a single parameter (n=1) will 
not suffice to properly forecast our time series. For these reasons, we use in all our 
applications a value of n=2. 
      Equation (5.2) is called the system or transition equation as it tells us how the pa-
rameters change over time. Here we allow for a slow change from time t–1 to time t. 
This equation makes the model dynamic as it does not assume that the parameters 
are appropriate for all times, giving a local suitability of the model. This will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
At time t (hours) the random variable tY  expresses the total time of application 
usage in the interval ],1[ tt − . When we observe the value of 1−tY  we can use our model 
(Eqn. (5.1) and (5.2)) to give the forecast of the unknown tY . This is called one-step 
forecasting as it uses the current observation in order to predict the next observation. 
This is a simple idea behind the notion of our statistical prediction model. In practice, 
the model that we using is more complex in the fact that it is making one-step predic-
tion for as many steps as we define. 
Not only does our method provide the forecast as a single prediction number, it 
also gives forecast variance and the entire distribution of the forecasts (this will be 
covered in Chapter 6). The forecasts are produced by an algorithm using the observed 
values of 121 ,,, −tYYY K  as well as some initial values of the estimates of the vector 0θ  
( tθ  at t=0). By these estimates we define its mean and variance at t=0, namely 00 ,Cm  
respectively. Then the algorithm forecasts the value of 1Y  as the quantity 0mF
T . Since 
we know 1Y , we can calculate the one-step prediction error, which is 011 mFYe
T−= . 
This tells us how close our forecast for t=1 ( 0mF
T ) is to the actual value 1Y . Ideally, it 
would be 01 =e , but this is only theoretically possible because our predictions can-
not be perfect. However, we may like to monitor the errors so that our predictions are 
not unrealistic. The algorithm carries on by calculating the next forecast based on 1Y  
and producing a forecast for 2Y . Every time we observe a value of our time series, we 
update the forecasts. The quantities 00 ,Cm  must be initially set. Here, if we choose 
n=2, 0m , we will get a 2-dimensional vector (that means we will have to specify two 
single values for 0m ) and 0C  will be a 2×2 matrix (that means we will have to specify 
three single values). Here we use Tm )1,1(0 =  and: 
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 


=
10
01
0C                (5.5) 
 
So we first have to calculate, for 1−t , the value of 1−tm which is )|( 111 −−− Θ= ttt DEm , 
where E  is the Expectation of the 1−Θ t  given 1−tD . We also need to calculate the 
1−tC which is )|( 111 −−− Θ= ttt DVarC , where Var is variance. 
 To calculate the predicted value, or the forecast for time t  we need to calculate tf  
first ,which is 1−t
tmF , and then we have to calculate tY . 
 So we have to calculate m again but this time for t= t : 
 
 )))(/(( 111 −−− −+= ttttttt mFYQFCmm δ             (5.6) 
 
where σδ += − /1FCFQ tTt  and also ))/((/ 2111 ttTttt QCFFCCC δδ −−− += . After sub-
stituting arithmetic values to our previous equations, we find the value of tY . And 
then we start again for our new value of 1−t  and t . 
 A few more initial values are needed for the implementation of the full algorithm, 
but these will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Table 5.1 shows an example of 
the actual values for 20 observations (time t=1 to 20) and the associated one-step 
forecasts for the last give observations (t=16 to 20). In Figure 5.2, the predicted values 
for this table (illustrated as a solid line) are shown against the real observations (illus-
trated as a broken line). It can be seen that the predictions do not follow the actual 
values.  This is because the initial data sample size is too small for any prediction 
model to have very accurate results. In addition, it can be seen that the prediction 
line is following the real observations line, and that they have similar slopes. This is 
an important factor in the prediction, as it is used in the prediction results and de-
picts that the user will have an increase or decrease in the use of the monitored 
resource, by just observing the slope of the prediction graph. 
 Thus, from Figure 5.1 we can conclude that our model has the potential to give 
information about the future use of a specific system resource, even if the initial val-
ues that are read before the prediction is started is minimal, and that the slope of the 
resulting prediction is an important factor. 
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Figure 5.2: Prediction results of the tutorial 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined a simple situation for the proposed forecasting model. We 
have seen how the model calculates the forecasting data. In this case our prediction 
was only five values, so the model did not had the opportunity to learn much from 
the previous values, and thus cannot make an a very accurate prediction. 
It can be seen that the model has potential in giving some indication about what 
the user will do next. In the following chapter we show exactly how our model works, 
and how we set up the initial values for the model.  
 
5.5 References 
[5.1]  Sen A. and Srivastava M. (1990), Regression Analysis, Springer-Verlag, New York. 
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6 Proposed Statistical Prediction System 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines the model published in the Journal of Forecasting [6.1]. It identi-
fies the theoretical part of the model, and how it works.  Bayesian is now applied to 
many areas, and is increasing in its relevance to many areas. In Chapter 4 has shown 
that Bayesian provides a better model than frequencism methods in areas such as the 
analysis of drug treatments, or in the analysis of DNA evidence.  The model assumes a 
hypothesis that in order to detect an intruder that we must forecast the future events, 
and then monitor the actual match between the forecasted events, and the actual 
events. An intruder, or someone who is acting fraudulently within an organisation, is 
likely to show changes in their behaviour, especially if they have used the user ID and 
password of another user. A simple example is if the system monitors the keystrokes 
of the user, and determines their typing speed. If the user normally has a typing speed 
of 20 words per minute, and the system forecasts this, then an intruder can be de-
tected if this rises over to 60 words per minute, or even drops to 10 words per minute. 
There are thus many differing monitors that can be applied to a user, such as mouse 
movements, keyboard strokes, processor usage, file access usage, disk size, usage of 
the graphical user interface, use of certain phases, email addresses used, and so on. 
In this research we focus only on application usage, as this can be easily measured, 
and can also be predicted, but it is important to understand that the methods can be 
easily applied to differing monitors, which may give improved intrusion detection.  
6.2 Model 
Our model has three phases of operation: 
 
• Observation stage. An important phase of the Bayesian method is the observation 
phase, in which the system will try to understand the monitored trend.  
• Evaluation phase. This is where the model makes a prediction and also monitors 
the user actual moves and determines a forecast. This stage is critical, as the 
model modifies itself according the need of the environment that it operates in.  
• One-step prediction. The system then goes into a phase where it is confidence 
about its predictions, and makes one-step predictions.  
 
As an example, let us assume that the user is logged in for 15 times and that the model 
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is configured and it is ready to start predicting user moves. Instead of making five or 
10-step prediction, like other mathematical models, our model makes a prediction for 
the next step. When the user logs-in and -out the model takes the actual behaviour of 
the user, and compares it with the one-step prediction that it has performed before 
and calculating the error. Thus, the next time a prediction is made for this user it will 
include the data of the last user behaviour. With this procedure, we maximise the ac-
curacy of the prediction system. 
 The general multivariate model (DLM) is given by the next equations [6.1]: 
 
 ],0[~,' Σ+= NvvFY ttttt θ        (6.1) 
 ],0[~,1 tttttt WNG ωωθθ += −        (6.2) 
 
We use multivariate models, as we want to incorporate and forecast several variables 
simultaneously. Again note that the parameters tθ  change both deterministically 
(through t) and stochastically (through the variance tW ), and thus make the model 
dynamic. Also standard ARIMA models are a special and restrictive case of the above 
model, when you set FFt = , GGt =  and WWt =  (all these three components are 
constant over time). This is restrictive as all these components are likely to change 
over time because data changes over time and that there are other external sources of 
variation (such as extra subjective information about a variable). Moreover, the sec-
ond equation is not observable. This means that we are never going to see any 
evolution or trend in a diagram or a graph. This is a hidden model that cannot as-
sume tW to be constant over time.  
 There is another  problem that we cannot ignore in multivariate models. The vari-
ance matrix Σ  will is not known. Often, in standard time series, it is assumed known 
and the researcher can easily jump to another problem. However, in practice, this is 
extremely difficult to set as a known matrix. It is very difficult to propose what vari-
ance to use to a system where 20 applications are considered and only 20 or 30 
vectors are collected as data.  
 Therefore, for all these reasons we need to consider the dynamic models. In addi-
tion, the system could provide forecasting as much ahead as we like, proving accurate 
according to the results. For this purpose, we used a Bayesian framework, which vir-
tually means that at time t we will have some kind of knowledge, which is a subjective 
belief, expressed in terms of a distribution. As said before the true strength of Bayes-
ian is that it is subjective in its approach, and that we can apply a prior probability 
distribution. Thus, we have a prior distribution of )|( 1−tt Dθ at time t. In other words, 
it is what we know before tY  becomes available. Once this happens, we revise this 
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prior belief, using the likelihood function (see Page 55, Chapter 4), to find the poste-
rior distribution )|( tt Dθ  or revised, which is better and more accurate. Then 
according to simple calculations, we find the prior of time t–1 and we calculate the 
posterior at t+1, only when information of the data 1+tY comes into the system (which 
is, in our case, is the real behaviour of the user). The model used becomes: 
 
• Autoregressive moving average model. The general model introduced by Box and 
Jenkins (1976) includes autoregressive as well as moving average parameters, and 
explicitly includes differencing in the formulation of the model. Specifically, the 
three types of parameters in the model are: the autoregressive parameters (p); the 
number of differencing passes (d); and moving average parameters (q). In the no-
tation introduced by Box and Jenkins, models are summarized as ARIMA (p, d and 
q); so, for example, a model described as (0, 1, 2) means that it contains 0 (zero) 
autoregressive (p) parameters and 2 moving average (q) parameters which were 
computed for the series after it was differenced once. 
• Identification. As mentioned earlier, the input series for ARIMA needs to be sta-
tionary, that is, it should have a constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation 
through time. Therefore, usually the series first needs to be differenced until it is 
stationary (this also often requires to logarithmically transform the data to stabi-
lise the variance). The number of times the series needs to be differenced to 
achieve stationary is reflected in the d parameter (see the previous paragraph). In 
order to determine the necessary level of differencing, one should examine the 
plot of the data and autocorrelogram. Significant changes in level, such as strong 
upward or downward changes in user behaviour, normally requires first-order 
non-seasonal (lag=1) differencing; and strong changes of slope normally require 
second order non-seasonal differencing. Seasonal patterns require respective sea-
sonal differencing (see below). If the estimated autocorrelation coefficients 
decline slowly at longer lags, and thus first-order differencing is normally re-
quired. However, one should keep in mind that some time series may require 
little or no differencing, and that over differenced series produce less stable coef-
ficient estimates. 
At this stage we also need to decide how many autoregressive (p) and moving av-
erage (q) parameters are necessary to yield an effective, but still efficient, model of 
the process (that is, with the fewest parameters and greatest number of degrees of 
freedom among all models that fit the data). In practice, the values of the p or q 
parameters are rarely greater than two (see the forthcoming material for more 
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specific recommendations). 
• Estimation and Forecasting. At the next step (estimation), the parameters are es-
timated (using function minimization procedures), so to minimise the sum of 
squared residuals. The estimates of the parameters are used in the last stage (fore-
casting) to calculate new values of the series (beyond those included in the input 
data set) and confidence intervals for those predicted values. The estimation 
process is performed on transformed (differenced) data; before the forecasts are 
generated, the series needs then to be integrated1 so that the forecasts are ex-
pressed in values compatible with the input data. This automatic integration 
feature is represented by the letter I in the name of the methodology2. 
 
In addition to the standard autoregressive and moving average parameters, ARIMA 
models may also include a constant, as described above. The interpretation of a sta-
tistically significant constant depends on the model that is used. Specifically: 
 
 
• If there are no autoregressive parameters in the model, then the expected value of 
the constant is µ , the mean of the series. 
• If there are autoregressive parameters in the series, then the constant represents 
the intercept.  
 
If the series is differenced, the constant represents the mean or intercept of the differ-
enced series. Thus, if the series is differenced once, and there are no autoregressive 
parameters in the model, the constant represents the mean of the differenced series, 
and therefore the linear trend slope of the un-differenced series. 
 ARIMA models are similar to our model. They use the existing data to calculate the 
parameters of the model. However, if, for example, some external information is 
available, such that we may know that it is user xyz and although they do not have an 
illegal user profile, it is very probable that at a specific point of time they will perform 
a huge invasion to an important application. ARIMA will try to change the parameters 
to adjust the model, but even in this case, it is doubtful how well the model will do in 
all the applications. With our DLM it is not a problem. Simply we add to the prior in-
formation we have, which is the external information. This is described as expert 
intervention, and the revised posterior probability takes into account the new knowl-
                                                            
1 Integration is the inverse of differencing. 
2 ARIMA – Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average. 
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edge. Our system is not assumed perfect when the model is fitted, and we let informa-
tion, no matter what its type, to allow the system to learn and improve itself. 
 Now our model is slightly different than the one we use for illustration purposes. 
We find recurrence relationships, which are more natural to overall long formulae 
that ARIMA works out. We note that because ARIMA is quite complicated, and many 
practitioners end up with a simple subclass of ARIMA model, that does not even start 
with assumptions. This produces results that sometimes do not correspond to the 
real application. The only difficulty with the DLMs is the specification of the initial 
values, such that the algorithm may be put into practice. In general, this requires to 
be solved by the experience of the individual practitioner. 
 In our case, we have to specify the following: 00000 *,,,,,, mFnSCm tδβ  is the 
mean of )|( 00 DΘ and 0C  its variance. The choices made are: 
 
• 00 =m . This is set when we expect that the prior distribution )|( 01 DΘ  (the dis-
tribution of the parameter Θ  at time t given 0D  – any initial information which is 
explicitly known) will not give any drift to 1Y . The fact that we expect this to hap-
pen, but we are not sure, so there is here an uncertainty, which is expressed by the 
variance 0C . It is natural and common policy to assume IC =0 , the identity ma-
trix. But care must be taken when we are very uncertain about our choice we 
MUST increase the diagonal elements of tC . Of course, this affects all the follow-
ing results somehow, but the approach is more realistic. In general, we will have 
more data vectors than 15, or 20 (our case), hence, initial values will dominate the 
actual estimates in a decreasing rate.  
• IC =0 . This is motivated by our belief that 0m  is not important to the following 
values of tY , t=1, ... 0S is typically, almost always set to I and it has not got any spe-
cial meaning. The only one we can find is that it is chosen such that according to 
the formula that we have to calculate 0, SSt  must lead to acceptable results (sym-
metric matrices). The 0n can be set to 0 (a case which implies 11 =n , without great 
loss) or 10 =n (a case which implies 11 += βn ). The choice of 0n  is not crucial 
since there is theorem that states that tS  converges to Σ as t goes to infinity and it 
does not depend on 0n . But it must take mall values.  
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• δ . The δ choice is discussed with details in Ameen and Harrison (1982a) [5.1] 
where it is shown that it must be 185.0 << δ  and quite high. Thus we have set it 
0.95.  
• β . The β  is a discount factor as well. In this document we state that it has to be 
smaller than δ , as, in general, tS  is not so much influenced by the data as it is tm . 
Note that δ is in tA and so it influences tm .  
 
The components are defined as: 
 
0m  The mean of the influence of 11 ,YΘ  from 0D , our initial info. 
0C   Dispersion of the above influence. 
0S   No meaning, and is an auxiliary quantity for tS . 
0n   Same as above. 
β    Factor of the influence of the data to the estimate tS . 
δ   Factor of the influence of the data to the estimate tm . 
tF    A basic quantity that expresses the linearity of the model and gives different 
trends to the several values of tY , both for time series analysis (what has hap-
pened in the past) and forecasting (what will happen in the future).  
 
Finally, we make clear that when we say factor in the above explanation we do not 
mean any percentage or whatever. Factor means discount factor, which means that 
the estimates of tm  and tS  are discounted somehow and in different rate, since both 
are influenced by data. 
6.3 Intervention 
Intervention is a mechanism for increasing the prediction accuracy to maximum. It is 
used when we have any additional information about the future behaviour of the sys-
tem, then we can thus add them to the model prior the prediction. For example if 
there is some users that are keen of using illegal software or there are new users that 
there is not enough information about their behaviour, by applying the intervention 
mechanism, we increase the accuracy of the model and can make more accurate pre-
dictions. 
 In our model, we can observe this by looking at Chapter 8. In these we can observe 
that our model prediction is very close to the actual users behaviour for the applica-
tion number 1 at the specific time t=19. We achieved this accuracy by applying the 
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intervention technique. We can also observe that the ARIMA model did not make any 
prediction for this particular user behaviour (see [5.2]). 
6.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we explained how our forecasting model works, and analysed all the 
parameters of our model, with an explanation of each of the initial parameter are, 
and how they are set. It has also included a general comparison with the ARIMA mod-
els, which are the current dominants on the forecasting practice. It will be shown in 
future chapters that the new model work better that ARIMA for this application.  
 From this chapter we can conclude some future research for our forecasting 
model. As we saw, some of the initial values of our forecasting model are set empiri-
cally from the feedback of the results of our experiments, or random with a minimum 
and a maximum limit. This sometimes has a negative effect to our results. Some fu-
ture research on the subject can find some configuration equations for more accurate 
and predetermined initial values. 
 We also have saw in this chapter the application of the intervention method, which 
enable our forecasting model to have accurate results, even in a small number of ob-
servations.  In the next chapter we will explain, in detail, how our software agent 
security environment is structured, how did we build it, and why. 
6.5 References 
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7 Software Agent Security System 
7.1 Introduction 
Previously we described the different computer security vulnerabilities, and the need 
for additional security. In addition, it has been proposed the reasons for prediction in 
a highly secure environment. This chapter describes the software agent security en-
hancement system implemented in this research, and outlines its main elements, and 
how they intercommunicate.    
 Figure 7.1 illustrates the difference between agent-based security and centralized 
security. Typically, security is implemented on a domain basis, where a central server 
holds the database on the complete domain. When a user logs into the network the 
host interrogates the domain controller, which grants the login or not. The domain 
controller will then grant permissions, or not, based on the rules on its database. Un-
fortunately, this type of system puts a great deal of emphasis on the central server. It 
can thus become the focus of an attack on the network, typically with a denial-of-
service (DOS) attack. If the central server becomes overburdened, or even stops work-
ing, the security for the whole domain will be affected.  
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Figure 7.1 Distributed agent-based security and centralized security 
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 An agent-based approach distributes the security, as a profile of the user is 
downloaded from the server to an agent running on a host, when the user initially 
logs in. The agent then becomes responsible for the security within the host. Its main 
responsibility is then to monitor the security conditions of the user until they log-off. 
The system implemented in this research uses agent which monitors the operation of 
a user based on previous events. The agent then forecasts into the future to deter-
mine their likely mode of operation. If this deviates from normal behaviour, the 
system administrator, via the server, is alerted [7.1]. The test results of the research 
have been applied to user behaviour for running applications, but could equally be 
applied to other user behaviour patterns, such as file access, folder access, keyboard 
usage, and so on. 
 Figure 7.2 illustrates the operation of the software agent security enhancement 
system. It consists of at least two software entities, the user-end agent and the core 
agent. The core agent is a collection of software objects that operate on the server and 
acts as a repository for user profiling information. The core agent focuses on predic-
tion profiling work, in the background when the server is not very busy. If possible, 
the user-end agent must be a fast acting program for real-time monitoring and have a 
small memory footprint. Figure 7.3 illustrates the main component parts of a core 
agent, these are: 
 
• Transmitter. This is responsible for getting secure information from the user-end 
agents, and sending back requested information and user profiles. 
• Actioner.  This informs the system administrator of any important feedback that it 
is getting from the various user-end agents. 
• Profile selector. This selects the appropriate profile for the specific user, which 
then is then stored locally on the server, and is received back from transmitter. 
• Statistical prediction result engine. This collects all the new profile information 
that the various user-end agents are sending. It compiles them through our novel 
prediction model, and creates some prediction results, that describe future user 
behaviour. 
• Main part. This is the part that coordinates all the individual components of the 
core agent system. 
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Figure 7.2 Software Agent Security Enhancement Topology 
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A user-end agent resides on every host on the protected computer environment. This 
agent is responsible for monitoring each user that logs onto the host. It is started at 
the logon process, and has system administrator privileges. These privileges stop the 
agent from being shutdown. It comprises of: 
 
• A sensor. This monitors the various software applications (for example, a word 
processor, a spreadsheet, or some system resources like the usage of a printer or 
scanner) that are currently being run by the user on that host. When a user logs-
in, the sensor polls the user’s activity every five seconds and records the user’s 
identifier, each application’s name, and process identifier.  
• A transmitter. After the first polling by the sensor, the transmitter sends this in-
formation to the core agent. The core agent then responds by sending a user 
historical profile. With an audit-log file for a period of one month, we observed 
that the size of an average user profile was between 400KB and 600KB, with a 
download time of between three and five seconds.  
• A profile reader. This reads the user’s historical profile.  
• A comparator. This compares the user’s historical profile with the information 
read by the sensor. If the current behaviour profile does not fall within the ac-
cepted behaviour pattern defined by the user historical profile, the comparator 
provides the transmitter and sends the following to the core agent: user identifier; 
invalid behaviour type; and corresponding invalid behaviour type data.  
• An actioner. This is an agent that executes the actions that have to be imposed on 
the system. According to the user behaviour, the actioner might have to send a 
visual message to the users screen for some warning or some additional help, or 
disable some actions of the user. The actioner part, along side with the main part, 
also uses that ‘prediction data’ for this user, to take preemptive actions on the 
user behaviour. 
• A main part. This makes decisions according to the information that is fed back 
from the comparator and the sensor. 
 
The operation of the user-end agent is illustrated in Figure 7.4. When the user-end 
agent is initiated, at the same time that a user logs-in, the transmitter part of the user-
end agent is activated, and connects with the core agent. When the connection is 
successful, the user-end agent identifies itself by sending a simple message to the 
core agent. In this way, the core agent knows the user name, the IP address, and the 
name of the host that the user started the user-end agent on. When the core agent 
gets all this information it then sends the corresponding user profile to the user-end 
agent (Figure 7.5). This profile, as outlined in Figure 7.6, is a collection of rules and 
data, such as real-time monitoring rules and prediction rules. The real-time monitor-
ing rules are set by the system administrator at the beginning of our enhance security 
 Software Agent Security System   83 
environment. They include areas of the network computer system that the users can 
or cannot access, software applications that users cannot use on their hosts, and so 
on. These rules can even include FTP or WWW locations that they administrators feel 
that the users should not visit. When each individual user logs onto a host, these rules 
are updated automatically, according to user behaviour. The prediction rules are then 
made from the statistical model, in order to predict user behaviour actions, before an 
incorrect action takes place. They consist of sets of values that describe the next pre-
diction time interval, and values that are generated by our ‘statistical engine’ and 
describe the level of use of the monitored resource. A sample of prediction rules is 
shown in Figure 7.6. 
 As seen Figure 7.6, the format of the user profile is simple. In the first section of the 
rules we have what the user is set to allow doing from the system administrators, 
when the system first installed. In the next section, we have what the system adminis-
trators are not allowing the user to do, in terms of resources that they are not allowed 
to access. Note here that they resources that are not specified are questionable and 
will be examined later by the system if the specific user accesses any of them. The 
next section contains the results of the evaluation of the user profile. 
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Figure 7.4 User-end agent topology 
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Figure 7.5 Interaction time chart between the two agents 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Typical example of the rule part of the profile 
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7.2 Profile information 
A profile is information that is compiled over time and describes the past user behav-
iour. It also contains basic rules that are set by the system administrators. All the 
profiles of the user are kept on the server that the core agent resides on. This informa-
tion is passed to the user end agent when they request it.  
 The core agent and the user-end agents communicate with simple text messages. 
The format of the messages is a simple send–receive pairs. For example, when a user-
end agent is loaded at the start of the user’s session, it requests information from the 
core agent. It then sends this as a message that contains some information from the 
user-end agent machine such as the IP address, the name of the user, the date, and a 
message to request profile information from the server, in an encrypted format. The 
server sends the profile information back in an encrypted form. 
 The communication language that we used is a simple text language, as this allows 
the agents to interact, and exchange the information. After an initial interchange, the 
information exchange is small, so there is no need for additional formal language 
heuristics that can add complexity. In addition, most of the message is data, that in-
cludes the rules that are interpreted when their reach their destination, so there is no 
need for additional complexity. 
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Figure 7.7 Profile structure 
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7.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the distributed security system using agent technology. A 
‘core’ agent on the server defines the security policy, while the ‘user-end’ agents ac-
tually implement the security on the hosts. Core agents act as data processing units 
and as data repositories for the user-end agents. User-end agents are individual soft-
ware entities that act autonomously, by monitoring the user behaviour, and taking 
specific action, depending on user behaviour. 
The forecasting part of the model resides on the core-agent side, and is responsi-
ble for processing the monitored data from the user-end agent, and generate 
forecasting data for the next session of the specific user. The ‘user-end’ agent gets this 
data when each user logs on to the computer network, and tries to predict future user 
behaviour. This data is not essential for the operation of our security enhancement 
system, but increases the protection of the system. 
Both agents are created by different modules, and are highly configurable. Some 
future researchers might want to redistribute tasks for each agent, or create more 
specialized agents for different tasks. Future work might move the forecasting mod-
ule from the ‘core’ agent and to the ‘user-end’ agent and repeat the experiments to 
discover if there is any difference in the results, and on system performance. In addi-
tion, there may be scope to create some different agents that are responsible for just 
processing data, on workstations that there idle, so the agents will be distributing not 
only the security, but also the workload of the processing requirements of the system. 
7.4 References 
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8 Experiments 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the range of experiments for the security system, and details the 
first two experimental cycles. It covers the nature of our experiments, and describes 
the aims of these. Also discussed is the requirement for the logical flow of the experi-
ments, along with the presentation of graphs with results that compare real 
observations and the results of the prediction statistical system.  
 The main objectives of the experiments are to examine: 
 
• The functional testing. This proves the functionality of the model, and verifies it 
can be implemented in a typical domain. 
• The model against the functionality of the misuse purposes. The misuse func-
tionality was tested by monitoring user actions (such as the applications and 
resources that they used) in real-time, and blocking the use of the specific re-
source if this was flagged by the comparator mechanism on the user-end agent. 
The information for blocking the actions of the user is inside the profile that the 
user-end agent gets each time it is started at the logon of every user. 
• The model against the statistical purposes. The statistical part was tested by 
processing the data in the core agent for each user, and creating or appending 
new information to the individual user profiles. After a user has logged-in and the 
user profile data was transferred from the core agent to the user-end agent, the 
user-end agent could use the comparator to not only check the user behaviour in 
real-time, but also check if the predicted profile is matching the one that is stored 
inside the user profile. 
 
The experiments are divided in three different stages that targeted different results: 
 
• Stage 1. This set of experiments verified that the model works, and to make tests 
on the entire agent environment.  
• Stage 2. This set was an extension in the number of users and data that we proc-
essed with in the model. These are tests that are more extensive and verify some 
changes that were done in the statistical model and some regression testing to 
verify that the agent environment could work in a distributed system. 
• Stage 3. This set of experiments verified that the model works, and gives the de-
sired results. It also includes some regressions testing to verify that our agent 
environment could work with large volumes of data and users. 
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Figure 8.1 outlines the operation of the model, and the range of experiments. For this 
the user is monitored for their usage of an application. The window size (n) defines 
the number of previous observations used in the prediction, and the prediction num-
ber (z) defines the number of predictions into the future, based on a number of 
previous observations. The time between observations is defined by t. Our model has 
three stages of operation. The stages are: 
 
• Observation stage. In this stage, the model is monitoring the user and records its 
behaviour.  
• Evaluation stage. In this stage, the model makes a prediction and also monitors 
the user actual movements and calculates the result. This is a critical stage, as the 
model modifies itself according to the environment that it operates in.  
• One-step prediction. In this stage, the model makes a single-step prediction. For 
example, assume that the user is logged in for 15 times and the model is config-
ured, and it is ready to start predicting user moves. Instead of making a five or ten 
step prediction, like other mathematical models, our model makes a prediction 
for the next step. When the user logs in and out of our model, it takes the actual 
behaviour of the user, compares it with the one-step prediction that it has per-
formed before and calculates the error. Therefore, the next time a prediction is 
made for this user it will also include the data of the last user behaviour. With this 
procedure we maximise the accuracy of the prediction system. 
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Figure 8.1 Experiment outline 
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8.2 System functionality 
In the first two experiments, we test the functional aspects of the system. Functional 
testing involves tested that all the different software parts are operating correctly. The 
basic functional tests were, in sequence: 
 
1.  Test the core agent and measure the system resources. In this we found that 
when there were no user-end agents live, that core agent consumes less than 
2% of the system resources. This is because the core agent is listening for any 
user-end agents every five seconds, and because it is multithreaded, the load in 
the system is minimal. After this, we started to start up user-end agents. The dif-
ferent software parts (core agent and user-end agent) where located on 
different computers on the same network. It was observed that each user-end 
agent was finding the core agent on the network, and was connecting success-
fully, and retrieving the required information. 
2.  Next a batch process was created to stop and start user-end agents. This al-
lowed a regression test for the connection of our system. For this, three hosts 
were used; one of which contained a core agent and the other two with user-
end agents. This was left to run for three days.  For this user-end agents created 
connections with the core agent and destroyed them when finish. At each time 
there were 20 user-end agents running on each of the two computers. After the 
three-day regression experiment, we counted that the system made around 
20,000 connections between the user-end agents and the core agent. At the end 
of the third day, the system was still up and running, so we concluded that our 
system could run robustly and the limit of the agent connections was only im-
posed by the performance of the computers and the memory that each host had 
to run our application.  
8.3 Real-time detection 
One of our key functionality tests in our security system is the real-time monitoring of 
each user. To test this we used users that were using the system and logging onto a 
university network to perform some predefined actions. They were given a degree of 
freedom by using anything additional to what the predefined steps were. The users 
were students of the School of Computer at Napier University, and they were familiar 
with computer use, and with the experiments that were run. They also had some ex-
perience of computer misuse. The time taken to gather the data took almost an 
academic year, mostly because of the difficulty to find spare time for the users to log 
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in and test our system. 
 The experiment involved giving a predefined script to use applications such as Mi-
crosoft Excel, Microsoft Word, Internet Explorer and Borland’s C++ Builder. For this, 
the user-end agents were configured to report any other software application that 
they used from the user, except these predefined applications. Every user-end agent 
scanned the host that they resided on for the status of the applications that are run-
ning, every five seconds. This time interval is user definable, but we chose this time 
interval because it does not add too much of an overhead on the system, and it is suf-
ficient to categorize it as real-time detection. The processing overhead of the system 
is small, as threads are used to make every action, such as scanning for what applica-
tions are running, or contacting the core agent. The thread mechanism gives us the 
advantage of spreading-out processor-intensive tasks, over time, and share the proc-
essor with the rest of the applications on the same host. In addition, by using threads, 
we are letting the host give the same execution time to our process as to the rest of the 
processes that run on the host. Our system successfully detected all the applications 
that were running on each user host, and alerted the users and the system adminis-
trator of any applications that were not authorized, even when that applications were 
started from the command shell. The use of the command shell, as apposed to the 
use of icons, is often a pointer to an advanced user, and could highlight a possible 
breach of security if the user changes their behaviour from mostly using icon-based 
programs to command-line ones, or vice-versa. 
In all cycles of our experiments, the real-time detection and the interconnectivity 
between agents was tested as the system had to be operational to get the statistical 
observations. For making the agents talk to each other, we used Java RMI (Remote 
Method Invocation). From this, it was possible for agents to exchange data, and use 
encryption to encrypt and decrypt the messages. As we can see in Figure 8.2, we have 
detailed the description of the creation of a message from user-end agent to sending 
it, and receiving it, from a core agent. This process gets more complex when there is 
more interaction between agents, and when the number of agents increases. All the 
communication between a core agent and a user-end agent takes at least the actions 
that described in the process in Figure 8.2. 
Real-time detection is one part of the enhanced security system, and gets its re-
sults from the comparator, the part of the user-end agent that gets data from sensor 
and from the user profile and determines the behaviour of the user.   
 
 Experiments   91 
User-end agent
MessageMessage
Insert header to 
the message. 
This is special 
Requests for.
Insert header to 
the message. 
This is special 
Requests for.
EncryptEncrypt
Pass to sender 
part
Pass to sender 
part
Take actions 
and store the 
data of the 
message
Take actions 
and store the 
data of the 
message
Get header,
and interpret file
Get header,
and interpret file
DecryptDecrypt
Get message
from receiver
Get message
from receiver
Create a reply
message
Create a reply
message
Add the headerAdd the header
EncryptEncrypt
Pass to sender 
part
Pass to sender 
part
Take action and
store the data of 
the file
Take action and
store the data of 
the file
Get the header
and interpret file
Get the header
and interpret file
DecryptDecrypt
Get message
from receiver
Get message
from receiver
Core agent User-end agent
 
Figure 8.2 Creating and transporting messages process 
8.4 Our Experimental Topology 
In our first set of experiments, we used only two PCs running Windows NT Version 4. 
They both connected to the university network through a 10Mbps hub. We used one 
user, which worked on the workstation. There were only two applications that there 
were monitored. The user was logging in the computer for one week.  
 In our second set of experiments, we used the same hardware configuration, with 
one user, but this time we used five applications to be monitored as system resources. 
In our last series of experiments, we used four computers one that played the role of 
the server and three that played the role of the workstations.  Again we used three us-
ers, but there are 10 applications monitored. The total amount of monitored time is 
50 hours. These experiments took approximately eight weeks to complete, because of 
the workload of the users. 
 The users in all of our experiments did not have a specific path of actions to per-
form when they were logged in the system. They had a minimal instruction set in 
order to use some specific applications, but not specific scripts. An important factor 
is to allow user impulses. The results of this is that if we observe that some times the 
user did not use all of the monitored applications at all during the monitored session. 
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8.5 Our first set of statistical experiments 
Intervention is a mechanism for increasing the prediction accuracy. This uses any 
additional information about the future behaviour of the system that can be added to 
the model prior the prediction. For example, if there are some users that are keen of 
using illegal software, or there are new users that there is not enough information on 
then we can apply the intervention mechanism, and thus increase the accuracy of the 
model and make more accurate predictions. Figure 8.3 illustrates intervention. We 
can observe from Figure 8.3 the sliding window is greyed. This is the initial minimal 
window that our prediction model uses to start producing acceptable results. In our 
case in these first experiments we used 20 initial observations, after which we gener-
ated some results. The prediction that we have is done for the next five observations.  
Our model is making a one-step prediction. This means that in order to find the next 
value or to make a one-step prediction, we need to know the previous observation. In 
other words, in order to make an observation for 1+t we need to know the value of 
the observation on time t . That does not stop the mathematical model from making 
predictions for more than one-step. In these experiments, we have done only five-
step prediction as we needed to verify that we are getting the expected results. In fol-
lowing experiments, we are increasing the number of predictions. In our third set of 
experiments, we are making 100 step predictions of our observations. 
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Figure 8.3 Intervention 
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Figure 8.4 The Real Observations of the Model 
 
Figure 8.5 The proposed Model 5 step prediction 
 In our model we can observe that in Figure 8.4 and 8.5, that our model prediction 
is very close to the actual users behaviour for the application number one at the spe-
cific time t=19. We achieved this accuracy by applying the intervention technique.  
 The first experiments are made in order to test our security environment on what 
extend it works and to get some results from our proposed statistical model. These 
results can also be compared to other statistical models. In this case, there was one 
user that logged on to the system for 20 times and had a one-hour session each time. 
We monitored all their operations and all the applications that they used. In our 
prediction model, we had only three applications to predict. The results of which are 
shown in Table 8.1. The intervals are from zero to unit and they denote an hour. 
Therefore, for example, 0.3 means that the user used this program for 0.3 of the hour 
(18 minutes), in this specific hour of the system usage. 
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 We used our prediction mechanism for the last five observations. As we can ob-
serve from the results, if we compare the graph in Figure 8.4 (for ARIMA), which is the 
real observations for the three applications, and the graph in Figure 8.5 (our model), 
we can see that the two figures are almost identical. We can see that they are less pre-
cise with the actual readings and they fail to predict the action of the user in 
application 1 at the time interval 19, in comparison with our model that predicted it 
with a very close figure. 
Table 7.1:  Invasion time (hours) in software agent environment 
Hour Application 1 Application 2 Application 3 
  1 0 0 0 
  2 0 0 0 
  3 0.01 0 0 
  4 0 0 0 
  5 0 0.1 0 
  6 0.2 0 0 
  7 0.25 0 0 
  8 0 0 0 
  9 0 0 0.05 
10 0 0 0 
11 0.01 0 0 
12 0 0 0 
13 0.3 0 0 
14 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 
17 0 0.01 0 
18 0.1 0 0 
19 0.4 0 0 
20 0 0 0 
8.6 Our second set of experiments 
In our previous experiments we used only one user and a limited observation of 10 
times. This time our experiments are more generic. By showing with our previous ex-
periments that our model works, we now use three users and with 100 observations. 
In this experiment the prediction model uses 50 observations in order to adapt to the 
user behaviour, and then apply the prediction model to the next 50 observations. For 
this experiment, time interval for the usage of the application is one hour.  
The results graph the last 50 real observation values and our predictions, and in 
the y-axis defines the usage. The users were monitored for the following applications: 
Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Internet Explorer and 
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Borland C++.  The users were free to use other applications and system recourses if 
they wanted to, but our system where monitoring only the above applications. There 
were no restrictions on when they use it, or how much time. 
For these experiments we assumed that only the first application was legal to be 
used by all the users (Microsoft Word), and the rest were available to the system but 
restricted from the users. We again used the time period of one hour to make our 
prediction.  
 Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show the results without any sort of intervention. We can see 
that our model is capturing all the different anomalies, with sometimes, luck of cap-
turing the length of the high peaks of the real-data graphs. The graphs show as 
prediction results that are taken from our agent environment. In the first two figures  
we can see that our model is able to keep with the changes of the user. Although our 
prediction is accurate, we have introduced the notion of the intervention that we ap-
ply in our last result (Figure 8.8). We can observe that the two lines are following each 
other. That means that our model is predicting very accurately the future behaviour 
of the user. 
 In all of our examples, we can see that our model is able to detect the deviations of 
the user behaviour, with maximum effects in the case of the use of intervention (see 
Figure 8.8).  
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Figure 8.6  Application one Prediction and real values 
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Figure 8.7 Application two Prediction and real values 
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Figure 8.8 Application five Prediction and real values (with intervention) 
Figures 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 show the results that combine ARIMA model results, Bayes-
ian model results, and the real results. We can observe that the ARIMA results, do not 
even try to follow the real observations, and in some cases we can observe negative 
values, which we cannot have since we cannot negative time. It does not make sense 
in our experimentation frame of mind. The results that we got for the ARIMA models, 
we obtained using ‘S-PLUS 2000’ statistical software package. We inserted all the 
range of the observations, and we made a prediction for the last ten observations, as 
we had done to our experimentation for our Bayesian model. 
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Figure 8.9 Arima and Bayesian results comparison chart for application 1 
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Figure 8.10 Arima and Bayesian results comparison chart for application 2 
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Figure 8.11 Arima and Bayesian results comparison chart for application 5 
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We can also find the deviation for the ARIMA model and the Bayesian model. For this 
we  use the absolute values of the difference, so we can see more precise the accuracy 
of our method. This gives Figure 8.12, Figure 8.13 and Figure 8.14. 
 Since we represent the three last graphs as absolute values, we expect our graphs 
to be as closer to the x-axis of the graph, as possible. Again, we can see that the 
ARIMA models have a very large deviation from the x-axis, in comparison with the 
prediction results of our model. 
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Figure 8.12 Absolute difference from the real observations for App1 
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Figure 8.13 Absolute difference from the real observations for App2 
 Experiments   99 
Absolute Deviation from Real Values
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Observations
Ti
m
e 
Sc
al
e
ARIMA Results Bayes Results
 
Figure 8.14 Absolute difference from the real observations for App5 
8.7 Conclusions 
These were the first two stages of our experimentation. We have found that our secu-
rity enhancement is working properly, and producing correct results. We also made 
theses experiments in order to verify the other part of our security enhancement sys-
tem, like to see if the different agent can communicate with each other, and transfer 
the correct information. 
We have found that at a low number of observations, such as smaller than 30; we 
have some times, similar results with the ARIMA models. This is expected as the 
number of results is too small, and the values can sometimes take random values that 
are close to the correct ones. 
We also found that the load on each workstation that each agent is residing is very 
small, and we typically observed an increase on workload of just 5%, and a 2% in-
crease in the core agent. This activity occurs when the user has increased activity and 
when the agent is trying to monitor all their moves. In addition, the memory usage is 
regulated by Java’s virtual machine, so we do not have any memory leaks, and our 
agent is using the exact memory that it needs. 
On server side, we observed that our agent was creating the profiles for each user, 
was not larger than 800 KB. This considered a small amount of data, even if there are 
a large number of users.  In addition, there was no problem trying to acquire large 
number of user profiles at the same time, as we use multithreading on the ‘core’ 
agent. 
We found also found an error of between 0.2% and 2.5% of the real value of use 
behaviour.  
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9 Results 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the results from a range of experiments which measure the per-
formance, in terms of software overload, and prediction accuracy, of the prediction 
model. Early sections have described the elements of the statistical system variables 
that are tested, and how the different experiments we achieved we done.  As men-
tioned in Chapter 8, the experiments verified that the model works, and gives the 
desired results. In addition, some regression testing has been done to verify that our 
agent environment could work with large volumes of data and users. The number of 
data that are processed in these experiments is large, so we cannot present all the 
data in this chapter. 
The first step in the experiments was to try to quantify the different aspects of our 
system in order to test them. After this, the values which were expected were derived, 
and these were compared with the actual results from experiments. This will give a 
theoretical outcome of each experiment, and after the practical result is determined 
the two are compared to determine how success the model is. 
The key factors for the statistic part of the experiments are: 
 
• Number of observations (NoO). Number of initial user behaviour observations, 
before the system start prediction results. 
• Time scale (TS). Time between two observations. For example, in our first two ex-
perimental cycles, we used a TS of one hour. 
• Prediction number size (in observations) (PSz). The number of predicted obser-
vations. For example, in our first test cycle, we used PSz of 10 and in the second 
test cycle the PSz was 25. 
 
Table 9.1 to Table 9.6 outlines the range of experiments. We are also going to perform 
some extreme tests in order to find the limitations of out statistical engine, and try to 
find the reasons why these limitations exist. Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.13 outline the re-
sults of these tests. 
Table 9.1 Keep TS and PSz constant, and change the NoO 
NoO TS PSz 
50 one hour 25 
100 one hour 25 
150 one hour 25 
250 one hour 25 
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Table 9.2 Keeping TS and PSz constant, and change the NoO 
NoO TS PSz 
50 10 minutes 25 
100 10 minutes 25 
150 10 minutes 25 
250 10 minutes 25 
Table 9.3 Keeping NoO and PSz constant, and change TS 
NoO TS PSz 
100 one hour 25 
100 2 hours 25 
100 3 hours 25 
100 5 hours 25 
Table 9.4 Keeping NoO and PSz constant, and change TS 
NoO TS PSz 
100 10 minutes 25 
100 15 minutes 25 
100 20 minutes 25 
100 30 minutes 25 
Table 9.5 Keeping NoO and TS constant and change PSz 
NoO TS PSz 
100 10 minutes 25 
100 10 minutes 50 
100 10 minutes 100 
100 10 minutes 250 
Table 9.6 Keeping NoO and TS constant and change PSz 
NoO TS PSz 
100 one hour 25 
100 one hour 50 
100 one hour 100 
100 one hour 250 
 
One comparison of the two values that we getting in every time t  is to compare the 
slope of the two graphs. In this way, even if the values do not match, if their slopes are 
close together, we have a very strong indication as to what behaviour the user will 
have. Therefore, we are including in our graphs some slope graphs. The purpose of 
putting the comparison of the two result slopes is to emphasize the fact that some 
times the graphs between the real values and the prediction statistical system values 
are not the same. 
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Figure 9.1 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 50 
 
Figure 9.2 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 50 
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Figure 9.3 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is 10 minutes for app1 
 
Figure 9.4 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is 10 minutes for app5 
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Figure 9.5 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 75 
 
Figure 9.6 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 75 
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Figure 9.7 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is one hour 
 
Figure 9.8 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is one hour 
 
 Experiments   106 
 
Figure 9.9 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 100 
 
 
Figure 0-10 
Figure 9.11 Prediction results with TS one hour and PSz of 100 
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Figure 9.12 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is one hour 
 
Figure 9.13 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is one hour 
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9.2 Experimental results of predictions with a time scale of 
10 minutes 
In this part of our experiments, we choose the time scale of our statistical model to be 
10 minutes instead of one hour. This, thus, takes a snapshot of the user behaviour 
every ten minutes, and predicting the user behaviour for the next 10 minutes. The 
number of the experimental results is the same in both the previous experiments and 
these ones. As of the number of the results was large, we have chosen a part of our 
experimental results, and graphed it. Figure 9.14 to 9.24 gives these results. An ana-
lytical list of all the experimental results can be found on the additional material 
provided with the thesis.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.14  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 25 
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Figure 9.15  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 25 
 
 
Figure 9.16  Slope Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 25 
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Figure 9.17  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 50 
 
Figure 9.18  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 50 
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Figure 9.19  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 50 
 
Figure 9.20 Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 50 
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Figure 9.21  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 150 
 
 
Figure 9.22  Prediction results with TS 10 minutes and PSz of 150 
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Figure 9.23 Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is 10 minutes 
 
Figure 9.24  Slope graph comparison between the two results where TS is 10 minutes 
Figure 9.25 to 9.28 show results using the same data, using ARIMA models and from 
our Bayes model. We can see the difference in the prediction; especially we can ob-
serve that our model can follow the real values, even in the smallest prediction 
periods. 
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Figure 9.25  Prediction results for ARIMA and Bayesian models for app1 
 
 
Figure 9.26  Prediction results for ARIMA and Bayesian models for app5 
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Figure 9.27   Prediction results for ARIMA and Bayesian models for app1 
 
 
Figure 9.28   Prediction results for ARIMA and Bayesian models for app5 
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9.3 Result Evaluation 
This section discusses the experiments, and tries to make some logical conclusions 
on the research. This will describe the extent or our experiments, and with the help of 
graphs, we explain why our results prove that our initial hypothesis is correct. 
 As described in Chapter 8, the first experiments were made to test the fundamental 
parts of our software agent system. For this, we had to verify that all the components 
of our system was working. The experiments were thus not very extensive. For this, 
we deployed agents in different computers and tested if they were communicating 
with each other. We have done some regression testing by forcing the user-end 
agents to make continuous connections and negotiation, with the core agent for a 
large number of times (about 3000) over a period of three days. This allows us to see if 
we could force the system to fail. After three day, the system was still functioning 
without stopping any software part of the system and rebooting any computer. This 
verified that our system could function properly. 
 The second aspect of our system that we tested was the real-time monitoring. This 
was done by gathering the first results from our users. We have observed that every 
application that the users were using, and was reported back to the core agent. The 
real-time monitoring runs running by the ‘user-end agents’ every five seconds. In or-
der to keep the system usage to minimum levels, we are having made this monitoring 
multithreaded, so that the local computer load can determine how much priority it 
gives the process. With this observation, we have verified that our system were ready 
to be operational. We continue our experiments by collecting more data from users.  
 Every time that we were monitoring a group of user, we were testing not only the 
statistical prediction part of our system, but also the interconnectivity and the real-
time monitoring. The focus of the tests is mainly to different aspects of the security 
agent system. 
 The second cycle of our experiments was targeted at the statistical prediction 
model. As this model is tailored particularly for our application, we had to modify 
many of its aspects, and some of its initial parameters are taken random. We had to 
make experimentation to verify that all the values that we had chosen were giving ac-
ceptable results. We can see from Chapter 8 that the graphs with the real values and 
the graphs from our prediction model were very close. These were some initial ex-
periments that we made to see if the system was working. That is why the number of 
the observations was so small. 
As we can see in Figure 9.29, that the two lines that represent the real observa-
tions and the predicted ones, are not exactly matching. However, we can observe that 
if we get the any two pair of points from both graphs and calculate their slope, we can 
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see that it is very similar (Figure 9.31). This shows that even if our statistical predic-
tion model can not some times predict how long the user will use a specific computer 
resource in the future, it can predict if the user is going to use this specific computer 
resource or not. 
 It can be seen from Figure 9.30 that by applying intervention on our results, we can 
maximise the prediction of our statistical model. Intervention is a simple method that 
can be applied on specific time-periods that are predefined, and by calculating the 
error of each prediction, we can make our system extremely accurate. The reason that 
we do not apply intervention always, is that we add a small calculation overhead to 
the system, and most of the time the prediction results that we are getting before ap-
ply intervention, are sufficient. As we mentioned earlier, by observing just the slope of 
our predictions, we can predict the future user behaviour. 
 
App1 results App5 results Slope results 
 
 
Figure 9.29    Application 
results 
Figure 9.30    Application 
results 
Figure 9.31    Slope results 
Table 9.7 Observation results for two different applications 
After experimenting with all of our software environment parts, and concluding that 
they work, we started our third cycle of experimentation. The aim of this cycle was to 
prove that our environment was working as predicted, and to find the limitations of 
our current model, and suggest future research based on our model. 
As you can observe in this chapter, we first tried to isolate and quantify individual 
parameters of our system, so we can measure them and experiment with them. After 
that, we constructed tables that contained these parameters, in different combina-
tions, so we can make sure that we have tested many of the different potential 
possibilities. These experiments also tested the proposed limits of our system.  
For this we started by changing the time scale of the statistical system. As we said 
earlier, in our first experiments we used as time scale of once every one hour for the 
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observations. In these experiments, we used again one hour and also 10 minutes, as 
time scale. We can observe some results in Table 9.8 and Table 9.9. 
As we observe from these two tables, we can see that the two lines do not quite 
match each other. However if we observe the third graph (absolute values of the 
graph slope), we can see that the two lines are almost identical. This shows that the 
trend of our prediction is the approximately as the real observation. If we had the 
slope graphs of all of our results, we could observe that the slopes are almost identi-
cal. From this we can conclude that our model is working correctly, and the results 
are getting are similar to the expected ones.    
 
App1 results App5 results Slope results 
 
Table 9.8 10 minute time scale results 
App1 results App5 results Slope results 
 
Table 9.9 10 minute time scale results 
Table 9.8 and 9.9 contain graphs with results from our model, and the real values, and 
the slope of each observation (which is the third graph). The slope is a very useful tool 
to compare our results with the actual values. The meaning behind the slope is that if 
we observe the slope of each prediction, we can predict if the user is likely to use the 
resource that we are monitoring, or not. The prediction does not have to match ex-
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actly the value of the real observation, but to have the same slope as the real observa-
tion. We can see in that in Figure 9.32, that although the real values and the 
prediction results are not exactly the same, we can still predict accurately the future 
value or behaviour of the user. By comparing the slope, for the graph for the same pe-
riod, from the real values and the prediction values, we can see that both slopes are 
the same, or similar, which is enough to make a prediction. 
 We can now concentrate on the performance of our model. For this we use ARIMA  
to compare our results with. The reason for that is, is that this is the most wide used 
set of models.  We are going to present some sets of graphs that we plot the results of 
our model, the real values, and results that we got from ARIMA model, when we proc-
essed our data with S-Plus statistical package. These results are shown in Tables 9.10 
to 9.12. 
 
 
 
Number of observations
Time Scale Real Slope
Predicted Slope
Predicted Slope
Real Slope
 
Figure 9.32   Slope comparison example 
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ARIMA and Bayes Results for app1 ARIMA and Bayes Results for app5 
 
 
Table 9.10 ARIMA Bayes results for time scale 10 minutes 
ARIMA and Bayes Results for app1 ARIMA and Bayes Results for app5 
  
Table 9.11  ARIMA Bayes results for time scale 1 Hour and 25 numbers of predictions 
ARIMA and Bayes Results for app1 ARIMA and Bayes Results for app5 
  
Table 9.12  ARIMA Bayes results for time scale 1 Hour and 50 numbers of predictions 
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 We can see from the comparison graphs that the results we get from our model 
(Bayes) is more accurate than the ARIMA one. We can observe in every graph that the 
ARIMA result is almost a flat line. This is because ARIMA models cannot adapt to our 
fast changing system, and that ARIMA, as most of the forecasting models, are de-
signed for long-term prediction. 
 One way to see the difference is if we graph the difference between the ARIMA and 
Bayes results, and the real values. Let us assume that we have the initial graph in Fig-
ure 9.33. We have results from both ARIMA and Bayes. Now we can find the 
difference between the Bayes results and the real values, which is X, and the differ-
ence between the ARIMA results and the real values, which is Y. If we make another 
graph, and plot the difference for the Bayes, and the ARIMA results, we will have the 
comparison. This method is just an indication and it is not always true, as we are tak-
ing more information from our model results graph. One factor that we cannot 
demonstrate with this set of test is if our results are precise enough or whether they 
can predict when a particular user will use a system resource. The only way to com-
pare this is by looking the results graphs that contain information from both the 
ARIMA and Bayes models. 
 
 
X
Y
Real Values :
Bayesian Prediction values :
ARIMA Prediction values :
Number of observaions
Time Scale
 
Figure 9.33 Prediction difference example 
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App1 ARIMA Bayes difference App5 ARIMA Bayes difference 
Table 9.13  Accuracy difference between ARIMA and Bayes models with time scale one hour and 50 observa-
tions 
App1 ARIMA Bayes difference App5 ARIMA Bayes difference 
Table 9.14  Accuracy difference between ARIMA and Bayes models with time scale one hour and 25 observa-
tions 
From the graphs, we can see that there is a difference between our model and the 
ARIMA model, as we can observe that our graph results are closer to the x-axis than 
the ARIMA results. We can also see from the comparison graphs that the results for a 
small number of predictions, typically smaller than 30, that both models has a small 
amount of randomness in their results. Thus, we can observe that sometimes on 
small number of observations, ARIMA models might give the same results as our 
model. This is to be expected, and we see from the graphs that for larger observation 
numbers, that our model is giving more accurate results than the ARIMA model. 
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9.4 Conclusions 
We have made a comparison of our Bayesian prediction model with the real values, 
and with results from ARIMA model. We have found that our model, for the range of 
experiments conducts, that is much more precise than ARIMA models. We also saw 
that in some occasions, when the prediction is small, typically less than 30 observa-
tions, that sometimes our Bayesian model results has similar results to ARIMA. This is 
because both models cannot make proper predictions, as they do not have enough 
previous information.  The results with a higher prediction observation number, gives 
improved results for the Bayesian model than the ARIMA model.  
 We have also seen that intervention can be used to improve the accuracy of the 
prediction. The drawback of this is that it requires more precise tuning of the data be-
fore we use them to our model. 
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10 Conclusions and Future Research 
10.1 Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the main conclusions of the work, and recommends future re-
search. We started our research with a basic concept: that computer security is not 
complete for today’s computer networks. Some of the reasons that we make this as-
sumption, beyond our own experience, is that login and password access systems can 
be easily bypassed by intruders, and use this as an advantage to get into the rest of a 
system. Computer security is also largely based on human decision-making and most 
of the popular commercial operating systems are designed to be easy-to-use. Often 
computer security is left as a background task for skilled operators. Some of the rea-
sons for security not being the first priority are that operating system vendors do not 
consider high security to be of concern of their customers; and that the complexity 
that the extra security might add to the operator may make the operating system less 
attractive as a purchase. 
 Our research does not, in any way, replace existing security methods, especially 
related to security at the network and transport layers. The proposed system tries to 
integrates with existing intruder detection systems, with the minimum of overhead. 
For this, we used a distributed systems architecture, in order to reduce single point-
of-failures, manage fault tolerance, and redistribute the workload of the security en-
hancement to the entire system. Software agent technology is the most appropriate 
solution to this distributed system concept. For this, we have software entities which 
work autonomously and carry out decision making. These operate without the need 
for a central point. Software agents can also be easily upgradeabled and managed. 
They also are ad-hoc devices which give the opportunity of making changes to the 
system, without bringing the entire system down, thus not breaching the security 
protection. Agents thus overcome one of the major problems of software system, 
which is that software systems are becoming larger and more complex. This increase 
in size and complexity often increases the number of errors (software bugs) and the 
number of potential weak points of the system. Most users are now well aware that 
Microsoft Windows and associated software have many weaknesses which are often 
exploited by intruders. Many of these problems have been caused with the increasing 
complexity of the software. Agent technology overcomes this by engineering software 
entities which can be carefully crafted to meet a specific aim. They are also easier to 
test, and they have a limited number of inputs and outputs.   
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During our research on various intrusion detection and misuse detection sys-
tems, we discovered that most systems lack a vital component: that they only took 
action after an intrusion has been detected. We decide that this was a very serious 
weakness, and this led to the research on forecasting models. Our research revealed 
that most of the systems that used forecasting were either out-of-date, very difficult to 
configure, require specialized personnel, or the length of the prediction that they 
were making was long. These long-range predictions are good for making weather 
forecasts, long-range stock predictions and other kinds of long-range prediction, but 
they require a very large amount of data input, in order to be significant accurate. In 
intrusion detection, we wish to make short-term forecasts, as long-term forecasts 
may not accurately predict an intrusion in the short-term. 
We first decided that our problem of intrusion detection was a linear one. This 
means that if we have a way to quantify the user behaviour over time, we could feed it 
into a forecasting model and get some results. We researched other prediction tech-
niques, such as neural networks, but we decided that these were too complex for our 
problem. From the research on forecasting models, we found that Bayesian statistics 
fit exactly on our problem. Their general idea is that the models are small and can be 
easily configured. They can also produce accurate results in a short time. We have 
thus taken the general idea of Bayesian models, and fitted them into an intrusion de-
tection system, and created a novel Bayesian statistical model. Chapters 4 and 5 deal 
with the mathematical aspects of our model, are based on papers [10.1, 10.6] and on a 
periodical publication in the Journal of Statistics [10.7]. 
Our new Bayesian model is fairly simple, as it takes some initial empirical values 
which we found to be optimum for each time scale. These values are generated after 
three cycles of experimentation, and are used to gain predictions on. One advantage 
of our model is that it can process, in parallel, all the different series of variables that 
we have and give results. By this, we mean that if we have for a user, N (where N is 
greater that unity) number of resources that we monitor, prediction is achieved by 
running our model only one time, in comparison with ARIMA models which requires 
to be run for each resource individually. The simplicity of the model can be observed 
in the third cycle of our experimentation, when we did experiments with differing 
time scales. This time scale is the time between the two observations, and the time for 
the next prediction. In our model, all that was required was to change the input data.  
The results from the entire experimentation procedure were very positive. In the 
previous chapters, we made exact comparison of the results with the real values of 
the experiment, and with the ARIMA statistical models. It has been seen that the pro-
posed models are accurate in predicting changes of user behaviour. From our 
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experimentations we have observed that the model is between 0.2% and 2.5% more 
accurate than the ARIMA model. This is an arithmetic result and it is only specifies 
the arithmetic accuracy of our model. The results of our model are not interpreted 
arithmetically, but we look at the trends of our results. For this we look the slope our 
prediction to conclude on future user behaviour. The arithmetic accuracy defines as 
to how much the user will use or not, a specific resource. In the interpretation of 
whether the user is going to use the resource or not, the results interpretation of our 
model compares the slope of the results with the real values. Chapters 6, 7, are based 
are based on novel work and resulted in several papers [10.1–10.3]. 
Our security enhancement system can be applied to most computer networks. 
We designed our system to be an addition to the existing security of commercial op-
erating systems. It is focused on a highly secure environment, where any intrusion 
can be taken as undesirable (such as in a secure government or military-related envi-
ronment). Chapters 8 and 9 are the focus of the results on the research and is based 
on several papers [10.2–10.5]. 
10.2 Future work 
In our security enhancement model, our agents are static, and reside on the resource 
that they monitor. This makes the deployment of the system relatively easy, but does 
not take into account network resources that may highlight intrusion. For instance, a 
tell-tail sign is maybe where workstation disk drives are reformatted, or crashed on-
purpose, so that the intruder can exploit certain operating system security vulner-
abilities. One way to solve this problem is to add a transport mechanism the user – 
end agent. In this way, the user-end agents can detect that a specific resource does 
not have an agent, and actually clone themselves, which would be sent to the network 
resource which was operating without one. In addition, a core agent could monitor 
network resources that are responsible for, and if it detects some lack of communica-
tion from a user-end agent, then it could create a new user-end agent and send it to 
the network resource. In this way, they can operate in a more social way, and will thus 
have more control over their environment. 
 Another aspect of future research, is to add a recognised agent language to their 
inter-agent communication process. In this research we have implemented a very 
basic language that has the purpose of exchanging basic information between the dif-
ferent types of agent. With an enhanced security system, the agents will have to be 
more social, meaning that they have to exchange larger amount of information, or 
more often. For this, an enhanced language could be an agent language such as 
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KQML [10.8]. In this way our agents could communicate with other agent societies, if 
necessary, without the need of upgrade, or another software translation layer. 
 Another future research can be on how the agents, in our environment, can inter-
act with agents from other environments, or from the same environment. From a 
security aspect, the research has to find ways of identifying if the communicating 
agent has malice purposes, or not. A key to this is authentication. This is often rela-
tively easy for agents in the same environment, by adding an encrypted signature that 
they have to exchange as the first part of their communication. But agents from dif-
ferent environments, made from different vendors, will be difficult to identify and 
trust. One way, is to build certificates, similar to ones that they use today form access-
ing secure information on the Internet. Each agent would thus have their own 
signature, and they could thus be identified and trusted, or not.  
 Future experimentation can support a larger number of users (such as with 50 us-
ers), and a larger number of monitored resources (such as up to 30 resources). From 
our current experimentation results, we did not have any problems with the number 
of the users or monitored resources. Also in our experiments we used a timescale in-
terval of one hour, and also of 10 minutes. A fully range of experiments could reduce 
the interval to as low as one minute, and as high as one day, without making configu-
ration changes to the statistical model. The aim of this would be to create a statistical 
model that can work with different ranges and different timescales, with the mini-
mum configuration. In our experiments, we forced the system to the limit, such as 
making predictions with over a thousand values. For this very large numbers were 
generated (larger than 1060), which do not make any physical sense. Future research 
would thus investigate these limits. 
10.2 Future Research of our Statistical model 
Our statistical model is unique in the Bayesian literature, as it does not make assump-
tions of independence among the various computer applications. One major 
extension to the model is to reform it to model a matrix of data, instead a vector of 
data. With this, we can have many users working at the same time and many applica-
tions considered. The benefit of such extension is mainly in computational 
effectiveness and portability, but also in mathematical clarity.  
 The matrix version of the model was briefly described in this thesis is an efficient 
approach. Future research would further develop the statistical properties of this 
model.  A future project might mainly focus on the specification of the design vector 
tF . In this thesis tF  is assumed known and in our experiments we chose it randomly. 
The specification of design components is an active research area of Bayesian statis-
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tics and the problem is significantly important. By working on the specification of tF  
we may open a more general path of linear modelling in statistics. Our plan is to as-
sume that tF  is slowly changing with t , such as considering a third equation in our 
model:  
 
ttt cFF += −1  
 
where tc is an error factor measuring how much tF differs from 1−tF .  
 
tc may be a random variable (in which case tF will be random), or it may be a con-
stant value (in which case tF  is deterministic). If tF  is assumed random, the analysis 
we propose in this thesis may extend to more general results. Linear modelling with 
random design vectors is a very important area in the statistical literature and in our 
problem it will solve the problem of the specification of tF . 
Security, in general, is a major part in many organizations and quality control is 
now a major element of strategic planning and management of future performance. 
Statistics plays an active role, especially in time-series analysis and forecasting. Em-
ploying modern statistical methodology and not relying on the past can maximum 
security. A future research would look at how our models can be fitted to other secu-
rity environments. 
This research has revealed some of the weaknesses in performance with relatively 
small data sets of ARIMA models. Some authors have been addressed these weak-
nesses and have pointed out that Bayesian models overcome such weaknesses (see, 
West and Harrison, 1997, page 166). However, no author has considered a compari-
son of Bayesian time series and ARIMA models from an application point of view. 
Future research may wish take further comparisons and would see the differences 
from a practitioner's perspective. 
Another area, which is very likely to have a growth in the future, is to develop sta-
tistical software for Bayesian time series. Most of the existing software in this area 
lacks accessibility and user friendliness. Scientists and practitioners are starting to 
recognize the impact of Bayesian computation by developing computer-intensive 
software. Unfortunately, such software is not easy to be use by non-statisticians, and 
non-experts of the methods. Otherwise, we feel that Bayesian models will not be 
widely known and scientists may still use the older statistical methodology, like 
ARIMA and regression. 
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 i 
Acronyms 
 
 
ARIMA AutoRegressive Integrated Moving-Average 
BBS Bulleting Board System 
CGI Common gateway interface 
DLM Dynamic Linear Model 
DOS Denial of Service 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
JVM Java Virtual Machine 
KQML Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
RFC Request for Comments 
RSA Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
URL Uniform Resource Locator, previously Universal Resource Locator 
